Introduction
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is characterised by high levels of uncontrollable worry across a range of domains, accompanied by a variety of distressing psychophysiological symptoms (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). GAD is a common (Somers et al.,
2006) and potentially chronic condition (Yonkers et al.,
2000), associated with high levels of comorbidity (Kessler et al.,
2005) and psychosocial impairment (Hunt et al.,
2004). As a result, much research over the past 20 years has explored the cognitive mechanisms contributing to the development and maintenance of GAD, with the aim of identifying targets for intervention and treatment.
The metacognitive model of GAD (Wells,
1995) is based on the Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model (Wells & Matthews,
1994,
1996), a transdiagnostic theory that incorporates the cognitive and attentional processes and biases implicated in emotional disorders. In relation to GAD, the metacognitive model postulates that holding both positive and negative beliefs about worry results in heightened levels of perseverative thinking and distress. When perceived threats trigger intrusive negative thoughts (e.g., “What if it’s cancer?”), positive beliefs are activated (e.g., “Worrying helps me solve problems”), leading to the selection of worry as a coping strategy. This form of worry, which involves perseverative catastrophising about the perceived threat, is labelled Type 1 worry. With increased use, the Type 1 worry process becomes increasingly automatic, leading to the development of beliefs that worry is uncontrollable. Beliefs about the dangerous effects of worrying on one’s physical and mental health are then activated. These negative metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and danger subsequently result in the individual worrying about their worry (labelled Type 2 worry, or meta-worry). It has been proposed that Type 2 worry may also be exacerbated by an increased awareness of thoughts, and a lack of confidence in one’s memory (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells,
1997). Increased cognitive self-consciousness may heighten perceptions that worry is uncontrollable, while a lack of cognitive confidence may lead to repeated selection of worrying as a problem-solving strategy, further reinforcing negative metacognitive beliefs.
The metacognitive model hypothesises that the presence of Type 2 worry distinguishes people with GAD from those without, due to its association with counter-productive coping strategies such as attempted thought control and avoidance behaviours (Cartwright-Hatton et al.,
2004; Wells,
1995). The ineffectiveness of these strategies reinforces uncontrollability beliefs, leading to an escalation in worry and distress, which serves to further reinforce beliefs about the dangers of worrying and Type 2 worry.
The Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells,
1997) was developed to operationalise the metacognitive model of GAD. The self-report measure encompasses five factors corresponding to parameters central to the metacognitive model: (1) positive beliefs about worry (e.g., “Worrying helps me to solve problems”); (2) negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of worry (e.g., “When I start worrying, I cannot stop”); (3) lack of cognitive confidence (e.g., “I have a poor memory”); (4) negative beliefs about thoughts in general, including themes of superstition, punishment and responsibility (e.g., “It is bad to think certain thoughts”); and (5) cognitive self-consciousness (e.g., “I am constantly aware of my thinking”). The Metacognitions Questionnaire – Short Form (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004) was adapted as a more economical version of the MCQ to facilitate its use in research and clinical settings, with the previously heterogenic superstition, punishment and responsibility beliefs subscale renamed “beliefs concerning need for control” (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004).
Both the MCQ and, predominantly, the MCQ-30 have been employed to evaluate the predictions of the metacognitive model of GAD (White & Abbott,
2022). The MCQ-30 is also commonly administered in clinical practice, to guide the focus of metacognitive therapy (MCT; Wells,
2009) and evaluate changes in beliefs following treatment (e.g., McEvoy et al.,
2015b; van der Heiden et al.,
2012). However, the validity of the findings of this body of research is contingent on the reliability and validity of the measure itself.
A recent systematic review of measures of metacognitions about worry found that overall, the body of evidence supporting their psychometric properties was limited (White et al.,
2022). None of the ten identified measures exhibited strong evidence of sound psychometric properties across all of the areas assessed. This was predominantly due to the small number of studies and methodological limitations, including inadequate sample sizes, not involving the target population in item generation, and a lack of information on the measurement properties of comparator instruments and the treatment of missing data.
Of the measures designed for use with adults, the MCQ-30 received the most positive ratings of its psychometric properties, with moderate evidence found in support of its structural validity, internal consistency, and convergent validity. Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) indicated that a five-factor model approached a good approximation of the data, with most fit indices within acceptable parameters among two convenience samples of university students and non-students (Spada et al.,
2008; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004), a large community sample (Fergus & Bardeen,
2019), people with cancer (Cook et al.,
2014) and people with epilepsy (Fisher et al.,
2016). Fergus and Bardeen (
2019) also found evidence in support of a bifactor model, including a general metacognition factor. Internal consistency of the MCQ-30 subscales was acceptable, good or excellent within community (Spada et al.,
2008; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004) and health samples (Cook et al.,
2014; Fisher et al.,
2016). Test-retest reliability of the subscales ranged from poor to acceptable within a community sample, although these results were of questionable validity as the retest interval range from 22 to 118 days (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004). Convergent validity among community samples was demonstrated with measures of worry (Penn State Worry Questionnaire [PSWQ]; Meyer et al.,
1990) and trait anxiety (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory [STAI]; Spielberger,
1983) (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004). None of the reviewed studies provided evidence of the criterion validity of the scale. While there is some evidence of the reliability and validity of the MCQ-30 in community and health samples, no studies to date have examined the psychometric properties of the scale among people with GAD, nor identified clinical cut-off scores or sensitivity to treatment for GAD.
The overall aim of this study was therefore to assess the measurement properties and clinical utility of the MCQ-30 in treatment-seeking adults with GAD. It was anticipated that CFA of the MCQ-30 would reveal the same five-factor structure as that found in community samples, and that the total scale and each of the subscales would exhibit adequate internal consistency and test-retest reliability.
Concurrent validity was expected with alternative measures of the constructs purported to be measured by the MCQ-30, including problematic worry, uncontrollability and danger beliefs, and the need to control thoughts. Specifically, the following relationships were expected based on metacognitive theory (Wells,
1995) and previous findings: a strong positive correlation between Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs and the PSWQ; weak positive correlations between the PSWQ and Cognitive Confidence, Positive Beliefs and Cognitive Self-Consciousness; a moderate positive correlation between the total MCQ-30 and the PSWQ; a moderate positive correlation between Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs and the Anxiety subscale of the Affective Control Scale (ACS; Williams et al.,
1997); and a moderate positive correlation between Need for Control and the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos,
1994).
Consistent with the metacognitive model, it was predicted that the MCQ-30 would display convergent validity with symptoms of GAD, including heightened distress and quality of life interference. Specifically, it was hypothesised that all subscales and the total MCQ-30 would be positively correlated with the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q; Roemer et al.,
1995), the Stress subscale of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – Short Form (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond,
1995), and the Life Interference Scale: Worry (LIS; Abbott et al.,
2021). The magnitude of these associations was expected to be similar to those outlined above between the MCQ-30 and the PSWQ.
Regarding the clinical utility of the MCQ-30, it was hypothesised that criterion validity would be demonstrated via significant group differences between people with a principal diagnosis of GAD and non-clinical controls. Specifically, it was expected that clinical participants would score significantly higher on all subscales and the total MCQ-30 than non-clinical controls. Treatment sensitivity was also expected, as evidenced by a significant reduction in scores on the MCQ-30 following participation in a group-based psychological intervention. Finally, this study aimed to identify clinical responsiveness and cut-off scores for the total MCQ-30 and subscales, to assist in determining the levels of maladaptive metacognitions that are consistent with GAD presentations.
Discussion
The broad purpose of this study was to evaluate the psychometric properties of the MCQ-30 amongst a treatment seeking group of adults with GAD, with the aim of validating the scale as a clinically useful measurement tool to aid research, assessment, and treatment. The results provided novel evidence of the reliability, validity, and clinical utility of the MCQ-30 in a clinical sample, as well as providing further evidence of the central role played by metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of worry in GAD.
The CFA indicated that a five-factor model, measuring Positive Beliefs, Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs, Need for Control, Cognitive Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Confidence, approached an acceptable approximation of the data obtained with the MCQ-30. Although this study was slightly under-powered, half of the goodness-of-fit indices were within accepted parameters for good model fit, with the remainder slightly below the recommended threshold. These results with a clinically diagnosed sample differ from findings in community and health samples (Cook et al.,
2014; Fisher et al.,
2016; Spada et al.,
2008; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004), in which the majority of indices indicated good model fit. This suggests that the relationships between the factors of the MCQ-30 may differ amongst people with GAD compared to those without.
In support of this suggestion, the final model in this study indicated no covariance between Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs and either Positive Beliefs or Cognitive Confidence, whereas in previous studies, all five subscales were intercorrelated (Cook et al.,
2014; Fisher et al.,
2016; Spada et al.,
2008; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004). Thus for people with GAD, holding negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and dangers of worrying appears minimally related to holding positive beliefs about worry or a lack of cognitive confidence. Although the metacognitive model does not specify a direct relationship between positive and negative beliefs about worry, but rather a mediated relationship through Type 1 worry, the theory does hypothesise that the cognitive dissonance created by holding both types of beliefs contributes to the perseverative worry cycle and, subsequently, anxiety levels (Wells,
1995,
1999). The lack of correlation between positive and negative beliefs about worry found in this study appears contradictory to this prediction, but is consistent with findings of a recent study in a clinical sample of people with GAD, that showed no relationship between Positive Beliefs and Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs prior to treatment (McEvoy et al.,
2015b). There was, however, a weak correlation between these two subscales immediately following treatment (McEvoy et al.,
2015b), suggesting that perhaps participants lacked insight into their positive beliefs before treatment and only became aware of them through socialisation to the metacognitive model. In support of this hypothesis, the relatively low mean and significant positive skew to the distribution of Positive Belief scores in this study indicate that they are relatively uncommon, even among a clinical sample. Alternatively, it has been suggested that negative beliefs may be more salient prior to treatment, due to the distress and interference associated with clinical levels of GAD (McEvoy et al.,
2015a). Assessing belief and symptom change throughout treatment would help to verify this hypothesis.
Internal consistency and test-retest reliability in this clinical sample was adequate to good for all subscales and the total scale, indicating that the constructs assessed by the MCQ-30 can be reliably measured in adults with GAD.
As expected, the MCQ-30 demonstrated initial concurrent validity with a measure of excessive worry. Consistent with a university and health service sample (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004), significant positive relationships were found between scores on the PSWQ and each of the MCQ-30 subscales, indicating that higher levels of each of these types of metacognitions are associated with more Type 1 worry in people with GAD. The magnitude of the correlations for most subscales, however, was weak, other than for Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs, which had a moderate association with the PSWQ. This is also in keeping with community samples (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004), reinforcing the central role played by negative metacognitions in the maintenance of pathological worry. Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs scores were also significantly and moderately positively associated with those obtained with the Anxiety subscale of the ACS, indicating that negative metacognitive beliefs about worry are associated with a fear of anxiety symptoms in general. Similarly, there was a moderate positive relationship between Need for Control and the WBSI, indicating an association between metacognitive beliefs about the need to control intrusive thoughts and attempted thought suppression, consistent with the metacognitive model.
People with GAD endorsed significantly higher levels of all metacognitive beliefs and processes than people without, providing preliminary evidence of the criterion validity of the scale. As predicted, higher levels of negative beliefs about worry and intrusive thoughts, and higher awareness of one’s thought processes, were associated with more symptoms of GAD, as measured by the GAD-Q. The strongest correlation was again exhibited with Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs, further underscoring the cardinal role played by negative metacognitive beliefs about worry in maintaining clinical levels of GAD. Neither positive beliefs about worry nor a lack of cognitive confidence were associated with GAD symptom levels. This suggests that while these constructs may contribute to Type 1 worry levels, as discussed above, they are not involved in maintaining clinical levels of other symptoms of GAD, such as physiological arousal and interference. Consistent with this suggestion, cognitive confidence was not associated with interference due to symptoms of anxiety, and positive beliefs only marginally so. Each of the MCQ-30 subscales was, however, associated with psychological distress as measured by the DASS-21 Stress subscale, with the strengths of correlations following a similar pattern to those exhibited with the PSWQ. In summary, amongst people with GAD, convergent validity was consistently demonstrated between clinical symptoms of GAD, negative beliefs about worry and thoughts in general, and cognitive self-consciousness, but inconsistently with positive beliefs about worry and cognitive confidence.
Treatment sensitivity was supported amongst people with GAD through significantly larger reductions on all subscales and the total MCQ-30 following a 12-week CBT intervention for GAD, compared to a waitlist condition. Following a MBT intervention, scores on most MCQ-30 subscales reduced significantly more than waitlist, with the exception of Positive Beliefs and Cognitive Confidence. The largest MCQ-30 clinical vs. control and pre-to-post effect sizes were exhibited for Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs, providing further support for the centrality of negative beliefs about worry to clinical presentations and treatment of GAD. It should be acknowledged that reliable change indices (RCI) and clinically significant change (CSC) thresholds were not calculated in this study as the treatment condition included two separate interventions, neither of which were MCT, the therapy which specifically targets the metacognitive beliefs and processes measured by the MCQ-30. As such, it is recommended that future research evaluates these statistics by administering the MCQ-30 in a sample of people with GAD before and after MCT.
Regarding clinical responsiveness, a score of 61 on the total MCQ-30 was identified as indicative of a clinical level of metacognitive beliefs relevant to GAD, and all subscales discriminated effectively between people with GAD and those without. In this study, the Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs subscale demonstrated higher clinical sensitivity and discriminatory ability than the total scale, or any other subscales. It is important to note, however, that the MCQ-30 is not intended as a diagnostic tool, but rather as a measure of the metacognitive beliefs and processes relevant to the maintenance of GAD. As such, it should be used in conjunction with a well-validated diagnostic screening instrument as part of a thorough clinical assessment.
Taken together, the results of this study suggest that Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs could be a more accurate and parsimonious measure of the metacognitive beliefs relevant to GAD than the full MCQ-30. The subscale displayed higher sensitivity, positive and negative predictive power, and AUC than the total scale, as well as evidence of concurrent, convergent and criterion validity with measures of excessive worry, GAD symptoms and diagnostic status respectively. At six items, the subscale is also more efficient to administer than the MCQ-30 or the full 65-item MCQ.
Although this study provides novel evidence of the psychometric properties and clinical utility of the MCQ-30 in a clinically diagnosed sample of people with GAD, a number of limitations should be acknowledged. First, the demographic questionnaire included only male and female as options for gender. This may have excluded participants of other gender identities, thereby limiting the generalisability of the results. Second, as noted above, the study was slightly underpowered for factor analysis. Future studies should aim for a valid sample size of at least 150 to ensure adequate power. Third, the concurrent validity of Positive Beliefs, Cognitive Confidence and Cognitive Self-Consciousness was not examined, therefore future studies may consider the addition of alternative measures to comprehensively assess these subscales of the MCQ-30, such as the Why Worry-II (Hebert et al.,
2014) for positive beliefs about worry. Fourth, discriminant validity between psychological disorders was not evaluated in the current study, as the clinical sample was comprised solely of people with a primary diagnosis of GAD. Given that the metacognitive model of GAD is grounded in a transdiagnostic theory of emotional disorder, the S-REF model, it will be important to validate and evaluate the utility of the MCQ-30 in other clinical samples. Finally, treatment sensitivity was evaluated using participants in cognitive-behavioural and mindfulness-based group programs for GAD. Although the CBT program included components aimed at challenging both positive and negative beliefs about worry, the sensitivity of the MCQ-30 to metacognitive therapy for GAD has yet to be demonstrated.
Conclusions
In summary, this study provides the first evidence of the reliability, validity and clinical utility of the MCQ-30 with people diagnosed with GAD, filling a significant gap in the psychometric literature. In research settings, the MCQ-30 can now be more confidently used to test the predictions of the metacognitive model in clinical samples with GAD. However, the results of this study suggest that the Uncontrollability and Danger Beliefs subscale may be a more accurate and parsimonious measure of the metacognitive beliefs central to the maintenance of GAD. In clinical practice, it is therefore recommended that this subscale is used instead of the full scale to inform the client’s formulation and treatment.
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