Construal Level Theory (CLT) is a well-established, comprehensive framework that provides an account of the relationship between construal level and psychological distance, and the effects they have on cognitive processing and a wide range of phenomena. In this article we present a conceptualization of mindfulness based on the theoretical foundations of CLT. In light of mindfulness definitions and current research, it is difficult to determine whether mindfulness entails low psychological distance and concrete, non-conceptual representations of experience, or high psychological distance and abstract representations. We argue that mindfulness uniquely combines both. The two-dimensional model we present posits that mindfulness is characterized by a simultaneous decreased psychological distance from external sensory experiences and increased psychological distance from internal mental experiences. We highlight the uniqueness of this quality of mindfulness, and demonstrate how the formulation presented here not only aligns well with but also integrates research on mindfulness as a state of consciousness as well as a personality disposition. We further argue that this combination underlies the beneficial effects of mindfulness and delineate how it enables individuals to leverage the advantages and mitigate the drawbacks associated with both high and low levels of construal and psychological distance. The proposed two-dimensional model resolves contradictions in the literature, aiming to deepen our understanding of mindfulness, its benefits, and core mechanisms.
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According to Kabat-Zinn (2003), mindfulness is defined as an active, nonjudgmental, and receptive awareness of the present moment. The practice of mindfulness typically involves maintaining a focus on a specific target (e.g., breathing sensations), while observing openly and receptively the full spectrum of one's experiences without automatically reacting to them (Bishop et al., 2004). A mindfulness practitioner strives to avoid allowing the mind to wander into chains of associations that are disengaged from the present moment.
In recent decades, mindfulness has gained a great deal of research attention (Baminiwatta & Solangaarachchi, 2021), and there has been considerable effort devoted to describing and understanding this complex construct (e.g., Brown et al., 2007; Dahl et al., 2015; Garland et al., 2015; Hölzel et al., 2011; Kudesia, 2019; Lindsay & Creswell, 2017). However, there remains a need for integrative models that are supported by current, established psychological perspectives (Van Dam et al., 2018). Such models could provide insight into how mindfulness works, the nature of its benefits and the mechanisms that underlie them. Using the perspective of Construal Level Theory (CLT; Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2010), we present here a conceptualization of mindfulness that is grounded in a well-researched, comprehensive theoretical framework.
CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2003) is a robust, experimentally driven framework that elucidates the relation between psychological distance and the mental construal of phenomena. According to CLT, we can represent any event or object at different levels of construal. Construal level is the extent to which the individual's thinking is abstract or concrete. Lower-level construals are concrete, relatively non-schematic and contextualized representations, whereas higher-level construals are more abstract, schematic, and decontextualized. For instance, a lower-level construal of a sofa might be its physical shape, color, and size, whereas a higher-level construal might be the idea of a place to relax. Similarly, a particular activity may be referred to in terms of lower-level construal as "reading certain words", or in terms of higher-level construal as "acquiring knowledge" (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Abstract representations of objects or events are constructed by retaining their central features, while omitting those features that are considered incidental by the very act of abstraction. These representations are lacking detail, but they provide a deeper understanding of the objects or events they represent (Trope & Liberman, 2010).
CLT further argues that we use higher-level construals to mentally construct distant objects or events. Although our experience of the world is bound to the self in the here and now, we are able to mentally transcend this experience along different dimensions of psychological distance – social, spatial, temporal or hypothetical – which are cognitively associated (Liberman & Trope, 2008). In order to represent distal events, we use decontextualized, abstract high-level construals, which remain invariant across different distances (Shapira et al., 2012). Thus, high-level construals bridge across distal worlds, and connect objects or events to other distant objects and events.
Grounded in a rich body of evidence, CLT has been substantiated through numerous studies across various domains (Trope & Liberman, 2010). For example, manipulating temporal distance by asking individuals to envision themselves in a scenario a year from now, rather than tomorrow, shifts their thinking from concrete to more abstract (Fujita et al., 2006), illustrating how different timeframes can alter our mental representations. Similarly, spatial distance manipulations involve asking participants to imagine a scene happening in a distant location as opposed to nearby, prompting more abstract thinking about the distant event (Maglio et al., 2013). Social distance can be varied by having people consider the experiences of a stranger rather than a friend, leading to a higher level of construal for the stranger's experiences (Stephan et al., 2010). Lastly, hypotheticality can be addressed by asking people to assess the likelihood of improbable events compared to certain ones, which engages a higher level of abstract reasoning (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). These experimental manipulations of psychological distance have consistently demonstrated that as the distance increases, so does the level of abstraction in thought, thereby affirming the validity of CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010).
CLT associates low psychological distance and concrete thinking with automatic habitual behaviors and impaired self-control (Fujita et al., 2006). Fujita (2008) suggested that low psychological distance and low-level construals often result in self-control failure, because they facilitate decision making that is based on local, immediate incentives rather than on global, abstract consideration. For example, research on delayed gratification showed that greater temporal or spatial distance from a tempting object promotes children's ability to exercise self-control (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel et al., 1989), as does thinking about a tempting object in abstract terms (Mischel et al., 1989). Fujita et al. (2006) provided further support by showing that even priming participants with higher-level construals (e.g., asking them to generate category labels vs. exemplars, which induces high- vs. low-level construals) increases self-control. Their findings underscore the importance of construal level in modulating self-regulation processes.
CLT perspective on mindfulness: Contradictions and inconsistencies
The mindfulness state of consciousness entails being in close contact with our experience in the here and now (Kabat-Zinn, 2003; i.e., low psychological distance), without imposing biased or distortive conceptual representations on objects or events (Brown et al., 2007; Wallace & Shapiro, 2006; i.e., low construal level). Based on the perspective of CLT, then, one could argue that mindfulness clearly involves low psychological distance from experiences and low construal level of them. However, in contrast to CLT predictions, mindfulness does not appear to impair self-regulation, and in fact numerous studies show that self-control and self-regulation are among the key benefits of mindfulness (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2006; see Leyland et al., 2019). Enhanced self-control enables individuals to observe their experiences as they unfold without reacting to them automatically. For example, it allows meditators to observe their discomfort and unease while meditating in stillness, without constantly changing posture (Gunaratana, 2010). Thus, according to CLT, defining mindfulness as involving low-level construal and low psychological distance from the present moment seems to contradict its inherent non-reactive nature.
Using CLT to formulate mindfulness presents additional challenges. Although many conceptualizations of mindfulness clearly emphasize its low psychological distance aspects, others suggest that mindfulness is characterized by significant qualities of high psychological distance. For example, mindfulness has been characterized as involving "…a sense of distance between that thought and the awareness viewing it" (Gunaratana, 2010, p. 42). Furthermore, most definitions of mindfulness emphasize its concrete, non-conceptual nature; however, affect labeling, or the abstract verbalization of current emotional experience (i.e., their higher-level construals), is a widespread mindfulness meditation technique (Lieberman et al., 2011), and labeling is a common facet in instruments that assess trait mindfulness (e.g., the Describe subscale of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire; Baer et al., 2006).
Thus, mindfulness practice appears to have effects that are at odds with the core predictions and findings of CLT research, and moreover, the different definitions and conceptualizations of this state of consciousness seem confusing because they reflect both low and high psychological distance and level of construal. Is mindfulness characterized by a low psychological distance from experiences and their concrete, non-conceptual representation, or by a high psychological distance from experiences and their abstract representation? We argue that it uniquely combines both.
A two-dimensional model of mindfulness
Our experiences can be divided into two different categories: external and internal (Barsalou, 2003). The term “external” encompasses sensory experiences that originate externally from the mind, such as sights, sounds, smells or bodily sensations (e.g., sensing the air goes through the nostrils while breathing). Following Barsalou (2003), external experiences refer to the collection of holistic perceptions such as those that are captured by cameras, video or audio recorders. The term “internal” refers to mental experiences (e.g., thoughts, memories, concepts), which entail a conceptual system that is based on general knowledge and previous experiences. These experiences are inferential, allowing the cognitive system to go beyond sensory, perceptual input (Barsalou, 1999). Whereas these two types of experiences are distinct, they are interconnected. Emotions, for example (e.g., anxiety), are composed of both external, sensory experiences (e.g., seeing a lion running at me or feeling an increased heartbeat) as well as internal mental experiences (e.g., the thought “It's dangerous!” or the urge to flee the situation; Lang et al., 2000).
The CLT-based model of mindfulness presented here includes two dimensions that are based on these two categories: psychological distance from external experience or sensory input, and psychological distance from internal mental experience. One dimension refers to psychological distance from current sensory experiences. Our direct experience of the world is restricted to the here and now, but our minds wander off constantly, flitting from one thought to the next, planning, analyzing, interpreting and speculating, thereby disengaging us from many aspects of the immediate experience. Indeed, it has been shown that the human mind has a tendency to wander and become distracted from direct experience in favor of stimulus-independent mode of thinking (e.g., Brandmeyer & Delorme, 2021; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), and brain imaging studies suggest that such mind-wandering is the mind’s default mode of operation (e.g., Christoff et al., 2004; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Mason et al., 2007). Therefore, the dimension of psychological distance from external experience refers to the extent people are actively engaged with their direct sensory experience.
The other, interrelated dimension of our CLT-based model of mindfulness refers to psychological distance from internal or mental events. People are almost constantly absorbed by their own stream of consciousness, and they also tend to perceive themselves and their actions through the filter of their mental experiences (Pronin, 2008; Pronin & Kugler, 2007). However, internal mental events can also be experienced from a high psychological distance (Bernstein et al., 2015; Teasdale et al., 2002). High psychological distance from internal experiences allows people to observe such mental events without being absorbed by them and without having to habitually react to them (Kross et al., 2005). Thus, the dimension of psychological distance from internal experience refers to the extent to which individuals disengage from their own stream of consciousness rather than being absorbed in it.
According to the CLT-based model of mindfulness presented here, the mindfulness state of consciousness simultaneously involves low psychological distance from sensory input and low construal of such external experiences, and high psychological distance from internal mental experiences and high construal of them. We further argue that this combination, inherent to mindfulness, underlies its salutary effects. It enables people to benefit from the advantages and avoid the perils associated with both high and low psychological distances and high and low construals.
Mindfulness: A unique state of consciousness
The two dimensions that characterize mindfulness outlined above are clearly mutually reinforcing. Observing one’s breath closely, for example, allows meditators to also be at a high distance from internal experience (i.e., less absorbed in their own stream of consciousness) and vice versa. These dimensions, however, typically do not co-occur in other states of consciousness. Consider, for example, situations that require focused attention: in response to a threat, people tend to be alert and attentive to their immediate external environment (Koster et al., 2004), and this may also apply to many daily situations involving low psychological distance from particular external experiences (e.g., focusing on a challenging task, watching a sports game). However, these situations are also characterized by low psychological distance from at least certain internal experiences (e.g., fearful thoughts, task-related cognitions, one’s feelings of excitement, respectively). As opposed to other situations that involve focused attention, in mindfulness all internal mental experiences are actively experienced from an increased psychological distance. Furthermore, whereas a mindful state of mind involves decreased psychological distance from all external experiences, these situations typically involve low psychological distance from certain aspects of the present external experience but high psychological distance from others (e.g., concentrating on a basketball game while not hearing one’s spouse). It is worth noting that most practices of mindfulness involve focusing attention on a particular narrow aspect of the experience (e.g., breath sensations), in order to help the practitioner reduce distractions (Lutz et al., 2008). As Brown et al. (2007) pointed out, however, mindfulness practice should be distinguished from mindfulness as a state of consciousness, which is characterized by general openness and receptivity.
Figure 1 provides a schematic comparison between mindfulness and examples of other consciousness states, based on their psychological distance from internal and external experiences. As small children lack the cognitive skills to transcend the immediate experience (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), they can be likened to highly experienced mindful meditators who are closely attuned to the present moment. However, based on the present CLT-based perspective, young children are far from being “natural Zen masters”, because their experience is also characterized by low psychological distance from internal experiences. In contrast to mindfulness, the state of consciousness of small children is generally characterized by a low psychological distance from external experiences combined with a low psychological distance from internal experiences (Fig. 1, top left). Indeed, during the early years of life, behavior is heavily influenced by impulses, reflexes, and stimulus control. For example, delay of gratification appears to be virtually impossible for children under the age of four, but tends to become less difficult with increasing age (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).
Fig. 1
Comparing mindfulness with examples of other consciousness states based on psychological distance from internal and external experiences (see text for details)
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High psychological distance from both external and internal experiences appears to characterize the psychological defense mechanism known as "intellectualization" (Arnold, 2014; Fig. 1, bottom right). In this mode of thinking, individuals distance themselves from internal as well as external emotional aspects of situations by employing abstract, intellectual modes of thinking. For example, when asked if she loves her boyfriend, a woman might deflect by discussing various definitions of love. In doing so, she avoids directly confronting current external circumstances (e.g., her boyfriend's emotional vulnerability) as well as her own complex or uncomfortable thoughts and feelings about the relationship.
In complete contrast to a mindful state of consciousness, daydreaming and repetitive and prolonged modes of negative thinking such as ruminations and worries are characterized by high psychological distance from external experiences combined with low psychological distance from internal experiences (Fig. 1, bottom left). Daydreaming involves the flow of one's inner thoughts and occurs when attention shifts from present external activities toward personal and internal reflections. In rumination, there is less attention given to the contingencies of the present moment (Watkins et al., 2009), in addition to immersing and over-identifying with negative feelings and thoughts ( e.g., "I am worthless"; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). This also applies to excessive worry, which involves repetitive, uncontrollable preoccupation with imagined future events (Borkovec et al., 1983). As Fig. 1 shows, the model suggests these states of consciousness stand in complete contrast to a mindful state of mind, which combines low psychological distance from external experiences with high psychological distance from internal experiences (Fig. 1, top right). Based on this perspective, it is not surprising that mindfulness training has been used extensively to deal with prolonged and repetitive negative thinking (Watkins, 2008), as well as with harmful and problematic mindless modes of activity (Kudesia, 2019).
Empirical support for the two dimensions of mindfulness
Extensive research provides substantial support for both components of the current two-dimensional model of mindfulness. Many studies have demonstrated that mindfulness facilitates more accurate and efficient perceptual processes (Jensen, et al, 2012; Hodgins & Adair, 2010; Slagteret al, 2009; see Sumantry & Stewart, 2021, for a recent quantitative review), suggesting that it enhances attention to external, perceptual stimuli. For example, Jensen et al. (2012) utilized a wide array of tasks in a well-controlled study, and systematically investigated the unique beneficial effects of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) training on attention. They examined whether MBSR had unique beneficial effects on specific attentional subsystems that could not be attributed to other factors, such as nonspecific stress reduction or attentional effort. Results showed that compared to appropriate control conditions, mindfulness training was associated with significant enhancements of several aspects of visual attention, such as the threshold at which visual perception is detected and the capacity to maintain selective focus (Jensen et al., 2012).
Numerous other studies showed that mindfulness is associated with reduced mind wandering (Brandmeyer & Delorme, 2021), indicating a greater distance from internal mental events (e.g., Brewer et al., 2011; Mrazek et al., 2012, 2013; Tang & Posner, 2009). Moreover, extensive research (see Feruglio et al., 2021, for a recent review) has associated mindfulness with a focal reduction in the activity of the Default Mode Network (Raichle et al., 2001), a complex brain system that has been consistently linked to processes associated with mind wandering (e.g., stimulus independent thoughts, semantic processing).
Considering the seemingly contradictory associations between mindfulness and both low-level and high-level construals in the literature, Chan and Wang (2019) proposed that it might best be conceptualized as comprising two distinct elements, rather than as a single, uniform concept (see also Delgado-Pastor et al., 2015). Next, we explain how current research on trait mindfulness strongly supports this suggestion in line with the proposed two-dimensional model.
Disentangling dispositional mindfulness: A closer look at the Observing subscale
A two-dimensional construct. The current two-dimensional framework addresses a fundamental concern associated with the conceptualization of trait mindfulness and with the assessment of this construct. In addition to being commonly referred to as a state of consciousness, mindfulness has also been conceptualized and studied as a disposition or a trait-like quality (Hanley & Garland, 2017). Several hierarchical confirmatory factor analyses of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006), the most widely used multifaceted measure of mindfulness (Mattes, 2019), suggested that four of the five facets of this scale are components of a higher-order construct (e.g., Baer et al., 2006; Lilja et al., 2013). However, this did not apply to one specific subscale: Observing. Similarly, several additional studies indicated that the other four FFMQ facets consistently correlated with each other, but not with Observing (Goldberg et al., 2016; Petrocchi & Ottaviani, 2016; Siegling & Petrides, 2016). This pattern has been described as surprising and even counterintuitive (e.g., Baer et al., 2006; Desrosiers et al., 2014), particularly since Observing is generally considered to be a core element of mindfulness.
These findings, however, are in line with the present CLT-based two-dimensional model. Specifically, Observing, which assesses close attention to sensory input (e.g., I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face), is the only FFMQ subscale that reflects low psychological distance from external experiences. In contrast, Nonreactivity to Inner Experiences (e.g., I watch my feelings without getting lost in them), Acting with Awareness (e.g., When I do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted, reversed scored), Describing/Labeling with Words (e.g., I’m good at finding the words to describe my feelings) and Nonjudging of Experience (e.g., I tell myself I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking, reversed scored) all reflect high psychological distance form internal experiences and high construal level of such mental experiences.
The combined impact of both components. The literature strongly suggests the FFMQ Observing facet is problematic not only because of its questionable convergent validity with other aspects of mindfulness, but also due to its unexpected relationship with many psychological variables. A quantitative review of the relationships between dispositional mindfulness and the broad Big-5 personality dimensions revealed that while conscientiousness and neuroticism were significantly associated with four of the five FFMQ facets, neither was related to the Observing facet (Hanley & Garland, 2017). In another meta-analytic review, it was found that Observing was the only FFMQ facet that was not inversely related to a wide range of affective symptoms (Carpenter et al., 2019). Indeed, the results of many studies showed that, unlike all other FFMQ facets, Observing was not negatively related, or even positively related, to measures of psychological distress and psychopathology, including depression (Desrosiers et al., 2013; Soysa & Wilcomb, 2015), suicidality (Cheng et al., 2018), internalizing symptoms (Diehl et al., 2022), anxious arousal (Curtiss & Klemanski, 2014), thought suppression and dissociation (Baer et al., 2006) and stress (Brown et al., 2015). These findings, however, have been observed predominantly in unselected samples. The pattern of findings associated with Observing appears to differ among those who meditate regularly and those who do not, and the expected negative correlations between this facet and symptoms has frequently been found in samples containing experienced meditators (Baer et al., 2008; de Bruin et al., 2012; Rudkin et al., 2018; Van Dam et al., 2009). Thus, as Carpenter et al. (2019) showed in their quantitative review, the relationship between Observing and symptoms is moderated by experience in meditation.
These findings led several researchers to propose that close attention to one’s sensory input may reduce distress, but only when accompanied by additional skills cultivated through meditation, which are measured by the other facets of the FFMQ (Baer et al., 2011; Bergomi et al., 2013; Desrosiers et al., 2014; Lindsay & Creswell, 2017). For example, Lindsay and Creswell (2017) suggested that a lack of concurrent acceptance training alongside the development of attention monitoring skills might lead to heightened attention toward distressing stimuli, thereby intensifying negative emotional states. As such, the Observing subscale may well assess mindful noticing (and not, for example, heightened somatic anxiety; see Desrosiers et al., 2013; Raphiphatthana et al., 2016), but only in individuals who do not tend to become immersed in their internal mental experiences, as is the case with experienced meditators (Lilja et al., 2013). Accordingly, Eisenlohr-Moul et al. (2012) found that the Observing subscale was negatively associated with tobacco and alcohol use only at higher levels of Nonreactivity (e.g., When I have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let them go), but positively associated with problematic and impulse-governed behaviors at lower levels of Nonreactivity. Taking the CLT-based perspective proposed here, these findings indicate that low psychological distance from sensory input is inversely associated with distress and pathologically uncontrolled behavior only when combined with high psychological distance from mental experiences.
Clarifying the Observing facet. A core tenet of the current two-dimensional model is its foundation in Barsalou's (2003) differentiation between attending to sensory input and attending to internal mental experiences. This distinction aligns well with the results of a comprehensive study that focused on the Observing facet (Rudkin et al., 2018). This study examined the latent structure of items taken from several mindfulness questionnaires (including the FFMQ), which represent this construct. Using exploratory factor analysis, the authors identified three factors: Body Observing, External Perception and Emotion Awareness. In agreement with prior suggestions (e.g., Baer et al., 2006), the FFMQ Observing subscale loaded on the Body Observing and especially on the External Perception factors (see also Simione & Saldarini, 2023). Notably, none of this subscale’s items loaded on the Emotion Awareness factor. Based on the perspective proposed here, the first two factors assess people's awareness of sensory input, whereas the items included in the Emotion Perception factor (e.g., I am aware of thoughts I’m having when my mood changes) assess a tendency to pay close attention to mental experiences. In agreement with prior findings, only the Emotion Awareness factor correlated negatively with symptom measures (e.g., trait anxiety, somatic anxiety, worry). In line with the present model, External Perception and Body Observing, which focus on sensory input, demonstrated such relationships only in experienced meditators (Rudkin et al., 2018).
In summary, despite being central to many mindfulness conceptualizations, the literature indicates that the Observing facet of the FFMQ measures a construct that is distinct from other aspects of mindfulness. In accordance with the current two-dimensional model, which distinguishes between attending to sensory input and internal mental experiences, people may be independently high or low in each of these traits. Research also shows that the Observing facet typically does not show the expected inverse relationship with distress and psychopathology – unless other aspects of mindfulness are also elevated, as is the case with individuals with prior meditation experience. From the perspective of the current CLT-based model, experienced meditators are more likely than non-meditators to exhibit low psychological distance from sensory input and high psychological distance from internal mental experiences, aligning with these findings.
Discussion
The model proposed here suggests that mindfulness, whether conceptualized as a state of consciousness or a personality disposition, uniquely combines decreased psychological distance from external experiences and low construal of such sensory input, with increased psychological distance from internal experiences and high construal of such mental events. Below, we delineate the ways in which this unique pattern underlies the salutary effects of mindfulness observed in numerous studies (Berry et al., 2020; Blanck et al., 2018; Creswell, 2017; Hopwood & Schutte, 2017; Leyland et al., 2019).
A dual-component model
Recent theories from diverse fields suggest that mindfulness has a bifactor structure. These theories propose two distinct components that are somewhat similar to those discussed here, which interact synergistically. For example, Kudesia’s (2019) metacognitive practice formulation focuses on mindfulness training in organizations. It conceptualizes mindfulness by combining mindful attention, which underscores the initial perceptual stage of the sequential process of mindfulness, with mindful conceptualization, which centers on the subsequent conceptual phase in this process. Monitor and Acceptance Theory (MAT; Lindsay & Creswell, 2017) consists of two main principles or tenets. The first tenet asserts that the cultivation of attention monitoring abilities serves to heighten one's awareness of the current moment, whereas the second tenet asserts that the development of acceptance skills changes how individuals interact with their present-moment experiences. MAT further posits that mindfulness training effects arise from the synergy between monitoring and acceptance. The Mindfulness-to-Meaning Theory (MMT; Garland et al., 2015) suggests that mindfulness enhances interoceptive attention and weakens biases associated with the perceptual process, thus enabling individuals to shift their focus from habitual stress evaluations towards a metacognitive awareness state. According to MMT, this transition leads to an expanded attention to new information, facilitates a reappraisal of one's life circumstances and the savoring of positive experiences, and eventually leads to self-transcendence (Garland & Fredrickson, 2019). Finally, based on traditional Buddhist accounts, Dreyfus (2011) distinguished between mindfulness proper, which refers to the fundamental capacity of the mind to remain focused on its object without drifting, and clear comprehension, which represents the higher-level skill of monitoring one's mental states. According to this perspective, only by combining the ability to retain focus with the ability to employ clear comprehension, it is possible to fully grasp the comprehensive nature of mindfulness.
The components of mindfulness proposed by these models do not perfectly align with each other or with those presented here, but as further elaborated below, notable overlap does exist. Importantly, they all seem to differentiate, albeit in different ways, between attentional or perceptual processes, and more complex cognitive mechanisms that facilitate higher-order and more abstract outcomes. Also, consistent with the current perspective, these models underscore the integration of the two distinct processes or facets of mindfulness and their potential for synergistically impact mental functioning. Finally, they all posit that mindfulness extends far beyond a mere practice of non-evaluative engagement with the present moment, aimed primarily at improving distress management.
However, two key elements differentiate the current formulation of mindfulness from earlier ones: Barsalou's (2003) distinction between attending to external sensory input and attending to internal mental experiences, and the insights and extensive body of research grounded in Construal Level Theory, which serves as the foundation for the present model.
The salutary effects of mindfulness: A two-dimensional, CLT-based perspective
CLT proposes that low-level and high-level construals serve different cognitive purposes, contingent upon varying levels of psychological distance. In order to represent distal objects, high-level construals have evolved to maintain the essential properties of the reference object. Low-level construals, on the other hand, enable immediate use of objects or current involvement in activities by preserving their details (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Low-level construals reflect the present, while high-level construals transcend it; a concrete mode of thinking highlights differences (e.g., among objects or situations), while an abstract mode of thinking emphasizes higher-level, inclusive categories. We argue that the benefits of mindfulness stem from combining the advantages associated with each of these two seemingly incompatible processes. The present model of mindfulness further suggests that this unique combination enables mitigating the perils associated with each type of cognitive functioning.
Decreased psychological distance from external experiences. Because the state of mindfulness is characterized by decreased psychological distance from external experiences and low construal of them, it allows practitioners to be in touch with the present moment in all its fullness and richness (Shapiro et al., 2006). This aspect of mindfulness facilitates a focus on the specific and contextualized aspects of situations, enabling people to respond to them more appropriately. Also, as suggested by the MMT (Garland et al., 2015), when people are attuned to their direct experience, they notice that when their minds wander they lose contact with the present, which distorts and limits their perception (Williams, 2008). Indeed, a wealth of research suggests that overlooking lower-level contextual factors can lead to a variety of biases (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Kahneman et al., 2006). For example, people typically overestimate how they will react to both positive and negative events (Wilson et al., 2000). Similarly, Nussbaum et al. (2006) showed that in the context of high psychological distance, confidence in one’s abilities (i.e., a high-level construal) may lead to unfounded performance predictions, which do not take into account circumstantial, lower-level factors (e.g., task difficulty).
Other theoretical perspectives on mindfulness further highlight the beneficial effects of close attention to the present moment. According to MAT, for example, by increasing one's focus on the current experience, training in attention monitoring might facilitate the more frequent and heightened awareness of positive stimuli (Lindsay & Creswell, 2017). Taking a similar perspective, MMT (Garland & Fredrickson, 2019) underscores the significance of savoring, which entails not only focusing on the most prominent sensory aspects of objects or events, but also acknowledging their subtler characteristics and effects. This broadens the variety and depth of feelings and sensations that can be derived from experiences.
Low psychological distance, however, can also render individuals more susceptible to impulsive behavior, habitual responses and cravings triggered by local temptations (Fujita, 2008). We argue that by simultaneously maintaining a high psychological distance from internal mental events, mindfulness practitioners are able to observe external events from a low psychological distance, but without hindering self-control or facilitating maladaptive mental or behavioral responses.
Increased psychological distance from internal experiences. In terms of CLT, taking an active and abstract view of internal mental events (for example, through the use of affect labeling; Lieberman et al., 2011) facilitates a higher level of psychological construal of these events (Trope & Liberman, 2010). While practicing mindfulness, one endeavors to experience unwelcome thoughts, feelings, or urges that arise rather than avoid them (e.g., by using acceptance strategies; cf. Lindsay & Creswell, 2017), but in a distanced manner – without becoming immersed in them or acting on them. Similarly, adopting an accepting attitude toward positive experiences implies that such experiences are not eagerly sought or clung to when they arise, but rather they are observed and welcomed as they naturally unfold and recede (Lindsay & Creswell, 2017).
In alignment with the present perspective, Garland et al. (2015) proposed that mindfulness not only fosters close attention to sensory experiences but also facilitates decentering—a greater psychological distance—from one's thoughts and emotions. This process liberates awareness from rigidly structured narratives concerning the self and the world, and promotes the ability to make flexible and adaptive choices in responding to various situations (see also Bernstein et al., 2015). Thus, by maintaining a high psychological distance from their mental experiences, mindfulness enables practitioners to reduce the emotional and somatic arousal that may be associated with a concrete processing mode (Kross et al., 2005) and with maintaining a close psychological distance from one’s sensory input (Desrosiers et al., 2013).
CLT may further elucidate why maintaining greater psychological distance and higher levels of construal regarding one's internal mental experiences can bring about notable benefits. For example, Garland et al. (2015) proposed that mindfulness facilitates positive reappraisal, which entails expanding the scope of perspective to recognize that even challenging experiences have the potential to serve as catalysts for personal development and growth. CLT posits that abstract representations are simpler and more coherent because they omit or assimilate irrelevant or incidental details, and place the stimuli within a broader context (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Crucially, though, rather than simply being more ambiguous or vague than lower level construals, higher level construals provide additional information about the stimulus, its meaning, and its interconnections with other stimuli. Accordingly, concrete representations can be abstracted in various ways. For example, "reading a book" may be construed as "acquiring knowledge" or as "having fun". The higher-level construal encompasses aspects that are not readily apparent in the lower-level representation (e.g., the purpose of the action), and places the activity within a larger framework by defining its relationships with other activities and objects (e.g., "attending school" versus "playing outside", respectively). Similarly, an object (e.g., a bicycle) can be abstracted in several ways (e.g., as a means of transportation or as a form of exercise), and therefore be connected to different classes of objects (vehicles or fitness equipment, respectively). Thus, CLT outlines how the abstraction of appraisals, thoughts, feelings, and urges yields further insights into these internal experiences, facilitating their integration into wider and more diverse mental frameworks. For example, negative thoughts and feelings stemming from adverse experiences (e.g., a personal failure) can be seen not just in their immediate negative light, but also as opportunities for future growth and improvement (cf. Garland et al., 2015).
CLT's proposition that abstraction and higher-level construals enhance our understanding of stimuli and their relationships clarifies broader and more profound favorable outcomes associated with mindfulness. Dreyfus (2011) suggested that mindfulness “expands the scope of attention so that one becomes aware of the characteristics of experience” (p. 49), thus promoting the development of clear comprehension, which he describes as “the meta-attentive ability to monitor one’s mental states” (p. 50). In accordance with CLT, which suggests that higher-level construals provide greater insight into stimuli and their relationships, by viewing mental experiences in an abstract and distanced manner—rather than becoming immersed in them—practitioners are able to assess these experiences thoroughly and insightfully. Practicing mindfulness promotes the recognition of habitual patterns (Brown et al., 2007), distorted cognitions (Baer, 2003) and their antecedents and consequences (Gunaratana, 2010). Ultimately, the cultivation of this meta-cognitive ability fosters the development of a deeper understanding of one's own mind and a clearer comprehension of how it works (Dreyfus, 2011).
Morality and ethical behavior. Garland et al. (2015) posited that mindfulness may cultivate active involvement in a valued and purpose-driven life by encouraging the development of positive reinterpretations and emotions, thereby engendering profound eudaimonic significance. Values and ethical principles are commonly viewed as abstract cognitive structures that provide meaning and continuity to people despite the changing circumstances surrounding them (Feather, 1995; Rohan, 2000), and as guides for action across situations (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). For example, “Thou shalt not kill” is an abstract moral principle believed to be applicable to all contexts (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; see Alper, 2020). Research indicates that in line with CLT, core values and ethical standards, which are decontextualized and abstract in nature, are more likely to influence people's behavioral choices in the context of high psychological distance and an abstract set of mind (Choi et al., 2012; Eyal et al., 2008). Conversely, when psychological distance is low and the mindset is concrete, there tends to be a diminished focus on such abstract priorities, with more attention directed toward immediate, local concerns. However, this shift in focus is not necessarily undesirable.
High psychological distance enhances the effect of high-level internal construals such as ethical beliefs and personal values, and decreases the effect of low-level, contextual factors. Nonetheless, external context can be quite crucial (Bo O’Connor & Fowler, 2023). Taking Alper’s (2020) example, it is generally wrong to kill, but many will acknowledge that killing in self-defense may not be sinful. People do not necessarily adhere to deontological thinking, i.e., judging solely based on values without considering certain low-level, specific circumstances (Holyoak & Powell, 2016). Depending upon the particular aspects of a particular situation, an action that is generally regarded as a moral transgression may be deemed acceptable. Indeed, there has been considerable evidence that high psychological distance and abstract construals can impact moral judgments, but other studies have shown that local concerns can also play a role (e.g., Gong & Medin, 2012; Žeželj & Jokić, 2014; for a review see Alper, 2020). Thus, CLT suggests that high psychological distance and high-level construals increase awareness of consistency and similarities across different contexts, thereby enabling people to act according to their ethical principles, values and interests, regardless of the nuances of current circumstances. Low psychological distance, on the other hand, elicits concrete, contextual and detail-oriented low-level construals. These low construals are closely attuned to the immediate present, thus allowing people to respond flexibly to the contingencies of the current situation, and in accordance with their local needs and concerns.
The two-dimensional model presented here posits that mindfulness combines both high and low psychological distance from present experiences, thereby allowing practitioners to benefit from both worlds. High-level construal of internal mental experiences, which allows people to transcend habitual tendencies, urges and impulses, facilitates behavior that reflects their core values, ethical principles and moral beliefs. As these abstract cognitive structures become more salient, self-regulated, thoughtful behavior becomes more likely (Graham et al., 2009). The low psychological distance from external experiences and the outside world enables people to do so in a flexible, non-dogmatic manner, which is responsive to concrete concerns and current circumstances (Alper, 2020).
Conclusion
We propose a model that integrates mindfulness within the robust framework of CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010), defining mindfulness as a dynamic interplay of two psychological distances: a decreased distance from external or sensory events and an increased distance from internal or mental events. Table 1 summarizes key hypotheses derived from the dual-component, CLT-based theory of mindfulness, integrating the current literature and outlining directions for future research and for clinical practice. Crucially, the core tenet of the present two-dimensional model is that both components are essential for defining, measuring, and enhancing mindfulness, irrespective of the context—be it a brief laboratory-based mindfulness induction or an intensive therapeutic training program. The essence and uniqueness of mindfulness are based on the combination of its core elements, and the absence of either element has the potential to yield adverse outcomes (e.g., Desrosiers et al., 2013). Thus, for example, we argue that a single total score from any mindfulness assessment instrument cannot adequately reflect this complex construct.
Table 1
Hypotheses on Mindfulness Outcomes: A Two-Component, CLT-Based Perspective
• By decreasing the psychological distance from external stimuli, mindfulness is expected to facilitate more accurate and effective perceptual processes, particularly in tasks requiring heightened sensory awareness
• By increasing the distance from internal mental events, mindfulness should decrease mind wandering and reduce activity within the Default Mode Network
• Mindfulness training should be effective for coping with pathological negative thinking (e.g., rumination, worry), which is characterized by the opposite pattern of psychological distances: high from external experiences and low from internal ones
• The essence and uniqueness of mindfulness are generally based on the combination of its core components; therefore, both are essential for defining, measuring, and enhancing mindfulness across different contexts and practices
• The two components of mindfulness are relatively distinct from each other; therefore, a single total score from any assessment instrument cannot fully capture this construct
• Observing, the only FFMQ subscale reflecting low psychological distance from external experiences, measures a construct that is distinct from other aspects of mindfulness; this should be evident in factor analyses and in its unique correlations with other variables, compared to the other four facets
• Observing assesses mindful noticing and is inversely associated with distress, but only in individuals who also show high distance from internal mental experiences; thus, the relationship between Observing and distress should be moderated by levels of experience in meditation
• By promoting distance from internal events, mindfulness allows for close observation of external sensory events without compromising self-control or encouraging maladaptive habits; this can be tested by evaluating these outcomes in individuals with varying levels of mindfulness practice
• High-level construals promote behavior aligned with core values, while low-level construals foster flexibility and responsiveness to current circumstances; thus, mindfulness-trained individuals should exhibit both stronger alignment with core values and heightened contextual flexibility
• Generally, the unique combination of low and high-level construals in mindfulness enhances the advantages and mitigates the perils associated with both concrete and abstract cognitive functioning
A number of questions remain unanswered and are beyond the scope of the current paper. For example, disengagement from one's own internal mental experiences has been a focal point in clinical theory, research, and practice for decades (e.g., Beck, 1970; Bernstein et al., 2015; Teasdale et al., 2002). In contrast, the core research on CLT has primarily concentrated on more fundamental types of psychological distance, including spatial, temporal, social, and hypothetical. Despite some efforts (e.g., Kross et al., 2005), further integration of these theoretical and research domains is necessary for a clearer understanding of the concept of distance from mental experiences. Also, the current perspective stresses that mindfulness should be conceptualized through both dimensions of the proposed model. Further clarification is needed regarding the implications of this two-dimensional formulation for studying mindfulness, both as a state of consciousness and as a habitual tendency. For instance, there remains a question as to whether brief mindfulness manipulations, commonly employed in numerous studies, are truly capable of eliciting both dimensions of this intricate construct.
In sum, endeavors to conceptualize and study mindfulness through the lens of Construal Level Theory have yielded inconsistent and sometimes conflicting findings (Chan & Wang, 2019). The two-dimensional model proposed here addresses the apparent contradictions in the literature and aims to enhance our understanding of the multifaceted nature of mindfulness, its benefits, and underlying mechanisms.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Tali Kleiman for her helpful comments.
Author note
Noa Bigman-Peer, now at the Department of Internal Medicine E, Beilinson Hospital, Rabin Medical Center, Israel.
Declarations
Ethics Approval
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Informed consent
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Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Use of Artificial Intelligence
AI tool ChatGPT was used to check grammar and improve English language.
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