Sedlmeier’s commentary posed the question “why should mindfulness practices work?” and expressed concern that “theoretical models for mindfulness practices are… still quite heterogeneous.” This theoretical heterogeneity—which cannot be dissipated simply by asserting a theoretical preference—Sedlmeier (
2025) saw as jeopardizing public health integration “in the long run.” Theories about why interventions work have typically sought to characterize factors or describe processes that causally mediate effects from interventions—their so-called “mechanisms” (see review by Tan,
2025; see Ross,
2021 on why “mechanism” can be a misleading metaphor even in biology). Such causal mediation theories have been called “program theory” by West and Aiken (
1997), and were called “impact theory” in the target article. Sedlmeier (
2025) was not fully explicit in articulating what he saw as the functional
uses of such mediation theories, and why theoretical heterogeneity might present long-run obstacles to public health integration. However, at least four potential uses of individual-level program impact theories seem particularly relevant to public health integration (these uses converge strongly with clinical uses articulated by Kazdin,
2007). The public health uses of program impact theory include:
(i)
understanding and documenting an intervention’s specific causal efficacy (as distinct from any common but non-specific processes, such as social support in a group-delivered intervention), thereby warranting the intervention as providing added value to health promotion and practice;
(ii)
informing research to determine who is likely to benefit most from the intervention (moderator effects), thereby helping guide priorities for social and individual allocation;
(iii)
informing efforts to ensure that interventions are safe at the individual level (see next section regarding population level safety); and
(iv)
identifying core intervention elements for guiding efforts to adapt the intervention to specific populations, or to identify relevant intervention analogues (i.e., overall functional substitutes), such as contemplative practices derived from indigenous cultural or religious traditions.
Yet solidly replicated empirical evidence of benefit—including evidence about generalizability across different groups—may warrant some degree of public health integration of mindfulness and meditative interventions even without impact theory breakthroughs. Consider, for example, the precedent of aspirin.
Aspirin and the Primacy of Practical Benefit
Aspirin illustrates that well-attested practical benefits can be compelling: Well before the discovery by John Vane (
1971) of its main physiological “mechanisms,” aspirin was “long the most widely used medicinal drug in the world” (Collier,
2024, p. 116). For generations, aspirin had been widely used in medicine and public health. For example, in the late 1950s, Kramer (
1958), in describing large-volume prescription items being dispensed in public health outpatient pharmacies, noted that “aspirin… leads all other drugs in volume of output” (p. 933). Yet historians have reported that at that time, “no one since… Heinrich Dreser [who died 1924] had actually bothered to investigate its mechanism” (Jeffreys,
2005, p. 220), and that at a celebration in the late 1950s of aspirin’s major US manufacturer’s production of its 100-millionth pound of aspirin, the industry’s keynote speaker noted that the “means by which aspirin succeeds in moderating pain” (p. 219) was still an open question. Yet the discovery by Vane (
1971) of physiological mediating pathways
was worthwhile: Over time, Vane’s discovery led to additional benefits, such as increased understanding of several basic physiological processes, and aspirin’s use in additional practical applications, such as age-tailored regimens to protect against cardiovascular disease (Collier,
2024; Jeffreys,
2005; US Preventive Services Task Force,
2022).
The benefits of mindfulness programs are not quite so dramatic and clearcut as the benefits of aspirin, however. Nor do their most noteworthy benefits generalize across groups so readily, with so little adaptation. Therefore, ongoing empirical and theoretical research on mindfulness and meditation impact processes is clearly needed to understand sociocultural and individual patterns of benefit and safety, and to guide optimal mindfulness adaptations and analogues. The next subsection argues that an optimal intervention may often be an analogue that maximally resonates with a population’s inherited worldview.
Practical Action Amidst Theoretical Heterogeneity
Absent unexpectedly dramatic theoretical progress, efforts to carry out the four tasks listed above—whether for clinical applications or for public health—will likely need to proceed on an evolving, iterative, and partially ad hoc basis, drawing upon theories deemed most compelling and relevant to the population to be served. Theorizations drawn from a community’s own worldview may often be deemed compelling by that population, and should thus be given a “seat at the table” (Minkler,
2010, S81; see also Albert et al.,
2023).
Developing the needed common understandings among community and professional partners might to some degree be viewed as a participatory research process (Cargo & Mercer,
2008; Levac et al.,
2019). In such circumstances, public health partnerships may draw upon emerging
tools for identifying and developing common ground. For example, recent public health initiatives have successfully used a method called by the possibly off-putting name of fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM), “a practical tool in participatory research [whose] main use is clarifying causal understandings from several knowledge sources” (Sarmiento et al.,
2024b, p. 1). As “a graphic technique to describe causal understanding” (Sarmiento et al.,
2024a, p. 1), FCM “provides a shared substrate or language for sharing views of causality [making] it easier for different interest groups to agree what to do next” (Sarmiento et al.,
2024b, p. 1). FCMs have been used, for example, to integrate conventional and aboriginal perspectives on diabetes and its management (Giles et al.,
2007). The method first emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in political science and computer science, and since that time has been used in fields that range from social science to biomedicine to artificial intelligence (Axelrod,
1976; Kosko,
1986).
Expanded-Hub Adaptation
What may be some of the major issues to bear in mind when building theoretical consensus for needed action? Palitsky et al. (
2025) have made an important suggestion relevant to progressing effectively with impact theory heterogeneity. They use the phrase “hub-and-spoke” to refer to the widely prescribed sequence of processes that is based on (i) identifying an intervention’s ostensible “core components,” followed by (ii) “identifying the needs for adaptation, and then modifying the intervention in such a way that its core components are preserved while addressing the adaptation needs.” Palitsky et al. (
2025) were concerned, however, that such widely prescribed hub-and-spoke adaptation processes “are most suitable for interventions whose core components are well understood and empirically verified,” which is not the case with mindfulness-based programs (MBPs). Instead, they suggest that “mindfulness needs a bigger hub, one that encompasses elements that primarily exist at the ‘spokes’… a conceptual expansion of the ‘core’ of mindfulness to include elements and changes that are successfully introduced in the process of cultural adaptation.” Examples of such elements could include interventions such as Centering Prayer among Christians (Knabb,
2012), as well as adaptations they mentioned from China and Australia. They arguably might also include various analogues mentioned in the target article.
The expanded-hub approach advocated by Palitsky et al. (
2025) has much to be said for it, and is perhaps not as novel as it may seem. As noted in a recent history of meditation research (Oman,
2021), new scientific research fields commonly employ simplified procedures and conceptions because they initially need such simplification to make their empirical task tractable. From that perspective, “several dominant trends in meditation research appear to have provided gifts of temporary simplification that the field has needed” (p. 46), such as the comparative neglect by Transcendental Meditation of ancillary practices (e.g., “informal practices” and “mindfulness qualities” as incorporated in MBSR). But then, “after a period of simplification, researchers have re-engaged with the temporarily marginalized facets of meditation, and re-aligned their models with the breadth of the phenomenon under study” (p. 46).
Committing to the expanded-hub approach by Palitsky et al. (
2025) could go a long way toward re-aligning the mindfulness field with its roots in the rich multicultural field of meditation and contemplative practice application and scholarship. And a strength of their proposal is its emphasis upon continuity: The current “hub” of MBSR and other so-called MBPs is not abandoned, but is rather positioned within a larger corpus—a larger
hub—of programs and interventions that possess what Peterson and Seligman (
2004, p. 35) called a mutual “coherent resemblance.”
But what exactly should be the
limits of such an expanded hub? Perhaps there lies the rub. Palitsky et al. (
2025) recommended a “conceptual expansion of the ‘core’ of mindfulness to include elements and changes that are successfully introduced in the process of cultural adaptation” and adoption of “common adaptation principles.” But without further specification, there would seem to be scope for considerable disagreement over what counts as “successful,” perhaps risking a variant of “concept creep” (Harper et al.,
2023; Haslam et al.,
2020).
Rosch (
2013), however, has articulated a simple hub-expanding suggestion that would enlarge the pool of interventions recognized as relevant: “bringing the research on mindfulness back to the context of contemplative practices as a whole might help serve as a corrective to some of the blind spots in the study of mindfulness” (pp. 244–245). Such a shift—if seriously integrated into the mindfulness field—could go a long way toward resolving the mindfulness field’s lag in cultural inclusiveness that impedes its integration into public health. Considering questions about mindfulness from such an enlarged perspective would also stimulate the mindfulness field with a fresh infusion of concepts and empirical findings relevant to causal mediation and intervention research (e.g., Farias et al.,
2021; Goleman,
1988; Oman,
2010; Shapiro & Walsh,
1984).
Moreover,
contemplative practice seems well-accepted and uncontroversial as a technical
name for the type of intervention to be encompassed by such an expanded hub. Besides Rosch’s use quoted above, the phrase “contemplative practice” has been widely used elsewhere (Crosswell et al.,
2024; Farb et al.,
2015; Plante,
2010). In this issue, for example, it has been used in the commentary by Knabb and Vazquez (
2025) to refer to the Christian meditation intervention they have studied, and in the title of the commentary by Galante and Van Dam (
2025), who also approved of “including mindfulness within the contemplative studies field.”
To return to the topic of “mechanisms,” improved approaches to understanding MBP causal effect mediators—in the language of Galante and Van Dam (
2025), better approaches to “retroactively build an academic theoretical and empirical framework around” MBPs—could potentially arise from repositioning the mindfulness field solidly within the broader study of contemplative practices. Like MBSR, many other systems of contemplative practice involve a foundational sitting meditation or “formal” practice, plus additional or “ancillary” practices (Oman,
2021; Plante,
2010). Like MBSR, most or all other systems include some form of emic or “face theory” that explains how the various practices work together to “retrain attention”—the “single invariant ingredient in the recipe… of every meditation system,” in the apt phrasing of Goleman (
1988, pp. 107, 169). And, like MBSR’s face theory, other systems’ face theories typically also include some account of how ancillary practices operate as part of what Goleman calls “the same basic formula” underlying all meditative systems, “the diffusion of the effects of meditation into the meditator’s waking, dreaming, and sleep states” (p. 112). I submit that much insight about causal processes might emerge from studying all these interventions in
comparative perspective.
How might such causal mediation be conceptualized and studied in a comparative context? The rudiments of such an approach have been sketched by Rosch (
2015), who as Sedlmeier (
2025) noted, has clearly articulated how MBSR can be regarded as a “complex intervention” (Hawe,
2015; Petticrew,
2011). Rosch (
2007) characterized MBPs as employing “mindfulness… as an umbrella justification (‘empirical’) for the inclusion of other aspects of wisdom that may be beyond our present cultural assumptions” (p. 262), and then went on to offer a “template of the factors at work” in MBSR, suggesting that “there are alternative ways that each of the factors can be instantiated… even religions could use the factors by substituting methods for achieving them based on their own beliefs” (Rosch,
2015, p. 279).
A similar “template” approach—essentially a list—can be used, I suggest, to study many individual contemplative practice systems (e.g., see Oman et al.,
2008; Shapiro et al.,
2008). And over time, such template approaches could be adjusted to generate comparative insight on common as well as unique elements in practice systems and their face theories, as well as insights about how effects from these complex interventions are causally mediated. Much MBP research has been quantitative, but template-informed qualitative or ethnographic analyses of interventions might yield much insight. How, for example, do intervention instructors and recipients narrate the uses and mutual synergies of various intervention practices (e.g., Oman et al.,
2008; Rosch,
2015)? How do they narrate the benefits of committing to routine formal practice?
Additional Suggestions for Exploration
At the current juncture of heterogeneously theorized mindfulness mediation research, I have three additional suggestions for specific elements and theories that appear to merit consideration. Each is compatible with an expanded hub, or repositioning of the mindfulness field within contemplative practice, as suggested above.
First, to address another “blind spot” in mindfulness research, the field should devote more attention to theorizing and exploring how mindfulness and other meditative interventions relate to
habit formation—and in particular, to building novel salutary health behavior routines. Regarding health behaviors other than meditation itself, evidence supports the helpfulness of MBPs for dissolving maladaptive health behaviors such as substance misuse (Li et al.,
2017). However, there is surprisingly little systematic evidence that MBPs can support establishing novel
proactive salutary behavioral routines, such as physical exercise routines (Creswell et al.,
2019; for physical activity, Schneider et al.,
2019 reported four null, two favorable, and one unfavorable randomized comparisons between mindfulness meditation and controls). Perhaps the only well-documented support given by MBPs to positive health routine formation is support for formal meditation itself: MBP intervention recipients are reasonably but not outstandingly adherent to home practice recommendations (e.g., practicing 64% of the assigned time, versus 70% average adherence overall for behavioral change interventions, DiMatteo,
2004; Parsons et al.,
2017). Such support is very important, as establishing regular formal meditative practice is widely understood as a key mediator of meditative intervention benefits, and encouraging regular home practice is thus drawing appropriately intensified scholarly attention (e.g., Miles et al.,
2023; Sharma et al.,
2021).
But what accounts for the weak evidence that MBPs can foster non-meditative salutary habit formation? A question of interest is whether such positive habit formation deficiencies apply only to MBPs, or more broadly to diverse sitting contemplative practice systems. A basis exists for hypothesizing an MBP-specific limitation: Substantial discourse and reflection on positive habit formation is clearly present in many if not most religious traditions (e.g., Pawl,
2023; note also reference to “language of
formation” in commentary by Sandage & Stein,
2025), but is noticeably absent from secularized mindfulness literature—for example, books by Kabat-Zinn (
1990,
1994) use the word “habit” with an almost exclusively negative valence, as if habits were never healthy, and always disempowering. And whereas PsycInfo searches for “habit formation” retrieve more than 1000 records overall, they only retrieve three publications from a journal or book with “mindfulness” in its title, with searches for “healthy habit,” “wholesome habit,” or “good habit” anywhere in mindfulness-titled journals or books retrieving only a single record (Miles et al.,
2023). Perhaps MBPs can be valuable aids, not yet empirically documented, to positive health behavior formation—but at present there is scant or negligible evidence, and we clearly need better understanding of the relation between various meditative practices and positive habit formation.
Importantly, although silence about positive valences of “habit” might have served useful purposes—perhaps setting a tone for the operation of MBP face theory and pedagogy—such silence seems of dubious adaptiveness for theory-building about mediators. Nor is such silence, or such a “blind spot,” required by contemplative traditions broadly, by Indic traditions, or even by Buddhism, which Sedlmeier (
2025) suggested as one “natural starting point for a theory of mindfulness practices.” For example, de Silva (
1979, p. 78) reported that “persistence and habit” is a principle meaning of the Buddhist concept
sankhāra, which might be translated as “conative disposition,” and that such conative dispositions “may be divided into wholesome and unwholesome” (p. 78). Similarly, the
Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali refer to beneficial wisdom-born
saṃskāras, sometimes translated as “mental impressions,” that classical commentators describe as beneficial, noting that “wisdom, or discrimination… produces its
saṃskāras just as all activities [of the mind] are bound to do” (Bryant,
2009, p. 162; Whicher,
2005).
Could such Indic concepts inform scientific attempts to theorize how meditative interventions—both MBPs and those built on other discourses—do or do not support establishing positive health behaviors? Or support cultivating compassion or other “mindfulness qualities”? Seemingly unexplored, for example, are how such Indic conative constructs might inform or be integrated with the influential and conatively relevant “cognitive-affective mediating units” theorized by Mischel and Shoda (
1995, p. 246), or other more recent node-based theories of personally persistent conative dispositions and qualities (e.g., Fleeson & Jayawickreme,
2015; Warren et al.,
2023; Wright et al.,
2021). Perhaps such theories could also shed light on the question posed by Sandage and Stein (
2025) about whether mindfulness itself—perhaps initially understood through a traditional Buddhist conceptualization—can be understood as a virtue, or whether it must be understood simply as a “tool.”
My second suggestion is that if there is any single new “element”—Palitsky et al.’s word—that especially merits consideration for integration into an expanded hub of MBPs, it is portable spiritual mantram repetition, mentioned in the target article as the core of a mindfulness analogue program, the Mantram Repetition Program (see also
Appendix). Portable mantram repetition is very simple, widely cross-culturally prevalent, possesses a solid and increasingly transdiagnostic evidence base for benefit, fosters documented increases in (widely used albeit debatably valid) mindfulness measures, and has generated validated train-the-trainer approaches (Bormann et al.,
2014; Buttner et al.,
2016; Oman et al.,
2022; Oman,
2024b). Even for MBP variants that retain “mindfulness… as an umbrella justification” (Rosch,
2007, p. 262), it would seem quite feasible to include mantram repetition as an aid to mindfulness under the umbrella of the MBP’s mindfulness-centered face theory (Oman et al.,
2022; see also Waelde,
2022). Moreover, Gethin (
2011, p. 270) reported that “ancient Buddhist texts understand the presence of mindfulness as in effect reminding us of who we are and what our values are,” and for many people, one may suspect that such a traditional value remembrance function of mindfulness would be better served by portably attending to repeating a mantram or holy name, than by attending to the breath.
The final suggestion is that the role of the mindfulness or meditation program instructor’s own practice may merit more theoretical elaboration and likely affirmation as a key causal factor. Kabat-Zinn (
2003, p. 149) has insisted that some necessary skills for program instructors “can come about only through exposure and personal engagement in practice” (p. 149), going so far as to state that he personally considers “sitting long [dharma] teacher-led retreats periodically to be an absolute necessity in the developing of one’s own meditation practice, understanding, and effectiveness as a [mindfulness] teacher” (Kabat-Zinn,
2010, p. xii). Kabat-Zinn (
2003) also wrote that in developing MBSR, “One major principle that we committed to was, and still is, never asking more of our patients in terms of daily practice than we as instructors were prepared to commit to in our own lives on a daily basis” (Kabat-Zinn,
2011, p. 290). Such insistence on the influential role of an instructor’s own personal (and home) practice diverges from the compartmentalization of work and personal life that is normative in most secular spheres of modern Western life, especially spheres that have become dominated by what sociologist Max Weber called formal rationality (Kalberg,
1980). (It also seems irreconcilable with proposals to replace human instructors with artificial intelligence, as per Tan,
2025.) But such affirmation is consistent with millennia of traditional educational understanding (del Castillo & Sarmiento,
2022; Oman,
2013a; Raina,
2002; Warnick,
2008). The mindfulness movement’s wide dissemination of this significant norm across many sectors of society is exceptional, perhaps unparalleled in recent years, and may plausibly have provided much collective benefit. Has today’s mindfulness movement begun building an important institutional middle ground between the dominant and compartmentalized secular forms of education, and the insights of holistic traditional education? Regardless of how one may answer such deeper questions, theorization of causal effects from MBPs would seem incomplete without fuller attention to causative influences from the instructor’s personal practice.