Introduction
As a crucial ability in daily life, decision-making refers to a set of cognitive processes enabling selection of an advantageous response from among an array of available options (Fellows,
2004; Gold & Shadlen,
2007). Psychological research suggested strong involvement of emotional experience in these processes (see Angie et al.,
2011 for an overview). Positive or negative emotions, as well as emotional regulation abilities, may influence appraisal of the potential consequences of a decision and their respective likelihoods (Werner et al.,
2009a). For example, anxiety modulates the tolerance for risk in experimental decision-making tasks, where highly anxious individuals tend to choose safer options than low-anxiety individuals (Maner et al.,
2006; Miu et al.,
2008). In further studies, positive affect was related to higher, and negative affect to lower, success levels in decision-making tasks (Buelow & Suhr,
2012; de Vries et al.,
2008; Suhr & Tsanadis,
2006). The personality systems interaction theory posits that during negative affective state individuals tend to prefer analytic strategies of information processing, whereas positive emotional state relates to a more holistic processing and intuitive decision-making (Kuhl,
2000).
Current theories emphasize the role of interactions between the brain and body in emotionally guided decision-making (Damasio,
1994; Thayer et al.,
2009). The somatic marker hypothesis may be most influential in this field (Bechara & Damasio,
2004). The theory posits that neural representations of physiological conditions (somatic markers) evoke feeling states that in turn support cognition, decision-making and behavioral adjustment. During decision situations, somatic markers (e.g., changes in heart activity or muscular tension) are generated together with emotional responses and connected to specific behavioral options. They are stored in memory and reactivated when similar situations occur, together with the corresponding options and likely outcomes. As such, somatic markers support decision-making via the endorsement of advantageous and rejection of disadvantageous choices. According to the theory, somatic markers are represented and regulated in central nervous emotion circuits, especially in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). In decision situations, they can be evoked in two different ways. Within the “body loop”, a particular somatic state is elicited and projected to the cortex by somatosensory afferents; and in the “as-if body loop”, the representation of the somatic state is activated in somatosensory brain areas without generating an actual peripheral physiological change. These processes may occur with or without conscious awareness. Somatic markers are believed to be particularly helpful in situations characterized by high uncertainty and complexity, where they enable rapid experience-driven decision-making (Bechara & Damasio,
2004).
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a well established decision-making paradigm developed in the context of the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara,
2007). It resembles real-life decision situations in terms of the uncertainty of outcomes and variable positive or negative consequences. The IGT requires the selection of cards from four decks (A, B, C, D), where each move can be associated with monetary gain or loss. Two decks (A, B) provide high gains and high losses. However, if these decks are selected continuously, a net loss results, such that they are disadvantageous in the long run. The two other decks (C, D) are associated with small gains and small losses but a gain results if they are chosen continuously, making them advantageous. Commonly, subjects acquire the optimal strategy to maximize total gain (i.e., choosing decks C and D and avoiding decks A and B) during execution of the task. Patients with damage to the VMPFC, where somatic markers are believed to be processed, showed impaired decision-making as they continuously chose cards from the disadvantageous decks instead of increasing the number of selections from the advantageous ones (Bechara et al.,
1994,
1999,
2000). Moreover, these patients generated smaller skin conductance responses (SCRs) than healthy individuals, especially in the period preceding card selection (anticipatory SCRs), which was interpreted as suggestive of impaired development of somatic markers.
In consideration of the relevance of emotional and somatic processes to decision-making, this study investigated the implications of individual differences in the startle reflex for behavior on the IGT. This defense reflex is typically assessed as the eyeblink that occurs after sudden and intense noise stimulation (Lang et al.,
1990). Its properties can be quantified via electromyography (EMG) at the orbicularis oculi muscle and according to the affective state (Bradley & Lang,
2016; Oskarsson et al.,
2021). Numerous studies using emotional pictures demonstrated that the startle reflex response progressively increases during the presentation of pleasant, neutral and unpleasant pictures (e.g., Aluja et al.,
2018; Bradley et al.,
2001,
2006; Larson et al.,
2000). The same changes can be induced using emotional stimuli like movie scenes, sounds or odors differing in pleasantness (Bradley & Lang,
2000; Ehrlichman et al.,
1995; Jansen & Frijda,
1994). Due to its sensitivity to affective valence, the startle reflex is regarded as a reliable physiological marker of positive and negative emotional state (Grillon & Baas,
2003; Lang et al.,
1990).
Several studies have investigated the connection between affective state and IGT performance. Building on reports of associations between negative mood and riskier judgements and behaviors (Arkes et al.,
1988; Nygren,
1998), Suhr and Tsanidis (2006) demonstrated that high negative affect, quantified with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson et al.,
1988), was related to poor IGT performance independent of personality characteristics. Similarly, Buelow and Suhr (
2012) reported that individuals scoring high for negative affect on the PANAS scale made more disadvantageous and less advantageous decisions. De Vries et al. (
2008) investigated the effects of naturally occurring differences in emotional state, and experimental manipulations thereof, on behavior in the IGT. Both approaches yielded evidence of better performance during a positive than negative emotional state. The association between emotional state and decision-making was explained based on the somatic marker hypothesis; it was argued that a negative affective state results in a tendency toward careful analysis of available information, whereas during a positive affective state individuals tend to rely on intuition and “gut feelings” (Bolte et al.,
2003; de Vries et al.,
2008; Wagar & Dixon,
2006).
It is important to note that the described findings of connections between affective state and IGT performance were exclusively based on questionnaire ratings for affect (Buelow & Suhr,
2012; de Vries et al.,
2008; Suhr & Tsanidis,
2006). In contrast, psychophysiological parameters of positive and negative affect have not yet been used in this context. This must be regarded as a limitation of the research field, as, by definition, affect constitutes a multidimensional phenomenon involving physiological components in addition to subjective experience (Bradley & Lang,
2016; Niedenthal et al.,
2025). The present study aimed to fill this gap in the literature by using the startle response as a psychophysiological indicator of affect and relating its strength to decision-making performance on the IGT. The reliable variation in the startle response according to affective valence makes it particularly suitable for this purpose. While other psychophysiological parameters like skin conductance, heart rate or muscle tension merely reflect emotional arousal, the startle reflex is unique in indexing the valence dimension of emotion (Grillon & Baas,
2003; Kuhn et al.,
2000).
The startle paradigm applied in the study involved eyeblink responses to noise stimuli during the viewing of pleasant, neutral and unpleasant affective pictures. The main hypothesis pertained to a connection between startle reflex amplitude and decision-making performance assessed via the IGT. Precisely, individuals exhibiting higher task performance (i.e., more advantageous and less disadvantageous decisions) were expected to be characterized by smaller reflex responses than those with low decision-making performance (i.e., by more disadvantageous and less advantageous decisions). This hypothesis is informed by the described dependence of startle amplitude on affective state; while larger amplitudes are regarded as a psychophysiological correlate of negative affective state, positive affective state is accompanied by smaller amplitudes (Bradley & Lang,
2016; Grillon & Baas,
2003). On the other hand, negative affective state is associated with more risky decisions (Nygren,
1998); and individuals performed better on the IGT during positive than during negative affective state (Buelow & Suhr,
2012; de Vries et al.,
2008). Altogether, these observations give rise to the prediction that larger startle responses relate to poorer IGT performance than smaller startle responses.
Discussion
This study investigated for the first time the possible implication of the activity of the startle reflex for decision-making. The eyeblink response to aversive noise stimulation was recorded during the viewing of pleasant, neutral and unpleasant affective pictures in healthy individuals classified according to their performance on the IGT. Participants with low IGT performance exhibited a larger startle response overall than those with high IGT performance. In the entire sample, the response amplitude increased from pleasant to unpleasant pictures. Furthermore, inverse linear associations were seen between IGT performance and the response amplitude during the viewing of pleasant, neutral and unpleasant pictures.
The startle reflex involves an automatic response to sudden and intense stimulation that is associated with the mobilization of defensive systems and unpleasant subjective experience (Lang et al.,
1990). It is regarded as a protective mechanism, facilitating coping with potential threats by interrupting current behaviors and focusing attention on the source of the threat (Oskarsson et al.,
2021). Though the startle reflex affects the entire body, the eyeblink constitutes the fastest and most reliable component thereof and is therefore commonly assessed in psychophysiological research (Bradley & Lang,
2016). The affective modulation of the startle reflex amplitude observed in the present study is in accordance with the literature. A large database substantiates startle potentiation during negative affective states; despite its somewhat smaller extent, attrition of the reflex during positive affect is also widely acknowledged (see Bradley & Lang,
2016 and Grillon & Baas,
2003 for overview). According to the SAM ratings, pleasant and unpleasant pictures were perceived as more arousing than neutral pictures. Nevertheless, the startle response progressively increased across pleasant, neutral and unpleasant pictures. This supports the notion that the reflex changes as a function of emotional valence and is virtually unaffected by arousal (Bradley & Lang,
2016; Grillon & Baas,
2003). According to the motivational priming hypothesis, defensive mechanisms, such as the startle reflex, are automatically primed during aversive experience; by contrast, positive emotional experience is connected to the inhibition of defensive mechanisms and activation of appetitive motivation (Lang,
1995; Lang et al.,
1990).
As illustrated by the learning curves, the group with higher IGT scores showed a strong increase in advantageous, and decrease in disadvantageous, decisions across the five blocks of the task. In contrast, no learning was evident in the group with lower IGT scores. The knowledge that differences in the startle amplitudes constitute a psychophysiological correlate of positive and negative affective states may be relevant to the association of the startle reflex with decision-making. As initially stated, individuals performed poorer on the IGT during negative than positive affective state (Buelow & Suhr,
2012; de Vries et al.,
2008). In addition, there is evidence that positive and negative emotional states are associated with different cognitive processing modes and specific behaviors in decision situations (Angie et al.,
2011; Bolte et al.,
2003). According to the personality systems interaction theory, a negative emotional state supports an analytic processing mode, whereas positive emotional state relates to a holistic processing mode and more intuitive decision-making (Kuhl,
2000). In accordance with this reasoning, Bolte et al. (
2003) reported that positive affect improved participants´ ability to make intuitive judgments about the semantic coherence of verbal stimuli; negative affect had the opposite effect. This may be relevant to the dependence of IGT performance on emotional states. With reference to the somatic marker hypothesis, it was claimed that under a positive emotional state, decisions are more likely to be made based on feelings and information arising from within the body (Bolte et al.,
2003; de Vries et al.,
2008; Wagar & Dixon,
2006). In complex and uncertain situations, such as that simulated by the IGT, unambiguous information enabling deduction of a rational strategy is unavailable; thus, affectively guided and intuitive strategies are more effective (Wagar & Dixon,
2006). This is illustrated by the observation that healthy individuals tend to decide advantageously on the task before being aware of the advantageous strategy (Bechara et al.,
1997). Furthermore, somatic markers (represented by anticipatory SCRs) are developed at a relatively early stage of task execution, and their generation relates positively to performance (Bechara et al., 1996; Wagar & Dixon,
2006). In contrast, explicit conscious knowledge of the relative value of the four card desks is gained in later stages (Bechara et al.,
1997; Maia & McClelland,
2004). Considering this, in the IGT, decisions driven by emotion and “gut feelings” (i.e., somatic markers), such as those related to a positive emotional state, may be superior to decisions based on analytic strategies, such as those related to a negative emotional state.
As a defense mechanism, the startle reflex is closely associated with the processing of threat and anxiety; hence, individual differences in its magnitude reflect differences in threat-related physiological reactivity (Lang et al.,
1990). It may be that individuals characterized by high threat-related reactivity also exhibit stronger bodily responses during the IGT, especially when considering risky decisions (decks A and B). In terms of the somatic marker hypothesis, highly reactive individuals would command a larger amount of somatic information, helping to avoid risky and thus disadvantageous decisions. Evidently, this was not the case in this study, as greater startle responses were associated with more frequent instead of less frequent disadvantageous decisions. It may be hypothesized that strong physiological activation does not necessarily imply improved emotional guidance in decision-making. To serve as somatic markers, physiological changes must be linked to behavioral options and, in addition, must be accessible to central nervous and mental processing. This is illustrated by a study concerning the role of interoceptive sensibility in decision-making (Werner et al.,
2009b). Performance on the IGT was compared between individuals with high and low interoceptive sensitivity, assessed via a heartbeat perception task (Schandry,
1981). While high interoceptive sensitivity was associated with better IGT performance, heart rate recorded during anticipation of decisions and feedback pertaining to gain and loss did not differ between individuals with high and low interoceptive sensitivity. This underlines that decision-making varies according to the accessibility of somatic feedback rather than its actual magnitude.
The extent of affective modulation of the startle reflex was unrelated to IGT performance in this study. Alterations in affective modulation were mainly observed in clinical conditions. While individuals with specific phobias exhibited greater affective modulation than controls (Lang et al.,
2005), the opposite was reported, for example, in depression and sociopathy (Kaviani et al.,
2004; Oskarsson et al.,
2021). This was discussed in terms of emotional and motivational dysregulations in the pathogenetic mechanisms (Grillon & Baas,
2003). Some studies also related individual differences in affective startle modulation to psychological features in healthy individuals (Cook et al.,
1991; Grüsser et al.,
2006; Vaidyanathan et al.,
2008); however, according to the present study, individual differences in the response magnitude seem more relevant to decision-making than variations therein according to emotional stimuli.
In addition to the impact of emotion on the use of emotional and somatic information during decision-making, top-down effects of high-order cognition on emotional processing should be taken into account in the connection between the startle reflex and decision-making. Decision-making involves weighing multiple alternatives and selecting an advantageous option while reflecting on potential positive and negative consequences; these abilities strongly depend on cognitive control (Fellows,
2004; Miller & Cohen,
2001). As a neural correlate of cognitive control, the prefrontal cortex plays a key role in decision-making (Miller & Cohen,
2001; Miyake et al.,
2000). The neurovisceral integration model posits a close interaction between the prefrontal cortex and activity in limbic structures, especially the amygdala (Thayer & Lane,
2008). In turn, the amygdala is relevant to the startle response. Though the startle reflex is characterized as a brainstem reflex, neuroimaging studies in humans suggest an important role of the amygdala in its affective modulation (Anders et al.,
2004). Kuhn et al. (
2020) conducted brainstem- and amygdala-specific fMRT during a paradigm in which the startle reflex was elicited during affective picture presentation. They identified a neural pathway including the nucleus reticularis pontis caudalis (PnC) in the brainstem and the centromedial fraction of the amygdala (CMA) that underlies affective startle modulation. While the PnC is crucial to the elicitation of the eyeblink response, affect-related activity in the CMA seems to determine the magnitude of PnC activation. Moreover, it is well-known that the amygdala becomes active during conditions of uncertainty; in terms of negative bias, it preferentially responds to threatening information (Cunningham et al.,
2008). Amygdala activation is regarded as part of a “default response” to uncertainty that corresponds to defense mechanisms like the startle reflex or the fight-and-flight response, protecting the organism and mobilizing energetic resources to ensure survival. Importantly, amygdala activity is inhibited most of the time via projections from the prefrontal cortex. However, inhibition strongly varies among individuals. Differences in prefrontal cortex function modulate top-down control of the amygdala, where poorer prefrontal function is accompanied by weaker inhibition and thus greater amygdala activity (Thayer & Lane,
2008). Considering this, larger startle response magnitudes may relate to amygdala disinhibition and greater threat processing due to poorer prefrontal function.
According to the SAM scale of valence, the participants in this study with high IGT performance perceived the emotional pictures as more pleasant than those with low IGT performance. This suggests a tendency toward more positive emotional reactivity in these individuals, which does not conflict with the proposed interpretations. A relevant limitation of this study pertains to the lack of assessment of variables that would have facilitated interpretation of the results in terms of relevant psychophysiological mechanisms. Measurements of emotional state during the IGT and subjective responses to noise stimuli could have substantiated the hypothesized role of individual differences in emotional state in the detected associations. In addition, recording of a parameter of autonomic function like electrodermal activity or heart rate during the IGT would have been beneficial. In future research, the role of prefrontal cortex function in the linkage between decision-making and startle reflex activity could be investigated by recording vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV). vmHRV constitutes an index of the integrity of prefrontal processing (Berntson et al.,
2016; Thayer & Lane,
2008). Moreover, individual differences in vmHRV are associated with cognitive control and emotional regulation (Appelhans & Luecken,
2006; Bair et al.,
2020,
2022; Hansen et al.,
2003). Another restriction pertains to the comparison of the groups composed according to median split. It has been shown that this method may lead to increased effect sizes for psychophysiological variables (Morriss et al.,
2024). However, our conclusions are also supported by the findings from the ANCOVA and correlation analysis, in which the IGT score was treated as a continuous variable.
In sum, this study revealed evidence of a connection between startle reflex activity and decision-making in healthy individuals. This association may be explained by individual differences in emotional state, which affect the startle response and modulate cognitive processing modes and decision-making strategies. Moreover, top-down effects of prefrontal cortex function on decision-making, emotional processing and the startle reflex are feasible. The study adds to the research on the peculiarities of the startle reflex in mental disorders like post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, psychopathy or substance abuse (Jurado-Barba et al.,
2017; Kumari et al.,
2001; Medina et al.,
2001; Oskarsson et al.,
2021), and its associations with personality characteristics like trait anxiety, aggressiveness and reward sensitivity (Aluja et al.,
2014; Blanch et al.,
2014; Sege et al.,
2018; Vaidyanathan et al.,
2008). The findings illustrate that the startle paradigm may be a useful tool to investigate the interaction between bodily states and higher-order cognitive processing in future psychophysiological research.
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