Recent conceptualisations of the processes leading to irritability implicate underling system activations via evidence of both threat and reward biases (Brotman et al.,
2017a,
2017b). In the model proposed by Kircanski et al. (
2019), reduced inhibitory control (as a facet of cognitive control) was suggested as an underlying cognitive process associated with greater expression of frustration and behavioural outbursts, thus implicating a broader self-regulation difficulty impacting goal maintenance. Further, Kryza-Lacombe et al. (
2022) described the mitigating role of executive functioning (cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control) on emotion regulation in reward biases among irritable youth. Recently, Brænden et al. (
2022) highlighted key themes as related to the RDoC domains that are implicated in irritability, including underlying negative valence systems (i.e., frustrative nonreward), positive valence systems (i.e., reward anticipation and responses), social systems deficits (i.e., interpretation differences, biases toward threat faces) and cognitive systems (i.e., cognitive control, inhibition). However, highlighted within Brænden et al’s (
2022) review was equivocal results given the intersection of cognitive systems with many of the RDoC domains (i.e., positive and negative valence systems, systems for social processes) thought to underlie irritability.
Dual Mechanisms of Control
As outlined above, the DMC framework draws together two distinct but interacting cognitive modes, including
proactive control and
reactive control. Consisting of goal-directed processing, proactive control involves top-down processing whereby individuals actively select goal relevant information in order to maintain their attention on task goals (i.e., anticipating and preventing possible interferences in attention prior to distraction occurring) (Braver,
2012; Braver et al.,
2009). For example, within the classroom setting, engaging in proactive control may involve a student anticipating distraction from classmates and actively selecting to maintain focus on goal-relevant information (and thus they are more easily able to filter out expected distractions).
On the other hand, reactive control is the process of correcting a response following interference in a goal-directed activity (i.e., detecting and correcting interferences in attention once they have occurred), such as correcting and redirecting attention away from classmates following distraction. Successful task engagement is thought to arise from flexibly implementing both proactive and reactive control, with changes in task demands likely to influence the control process employed (Braver,
2012; Braver et al.,
2009). Although greater resources (e.g., increased working memory load) are required to engage proactive control, the shift from youth spontaneously preferencing proactive control rather than relying on reactive control increases throughout childhood. However, once instructed to do so, children as young as preschool age are able to engage in proactive control (Gonthier & Blaye,
2022). For instance, anticipating possible interferences in attention from classmates (proactive control) may reduce the frequency of distraction, however reliance on redirection of attention back to a task following distraction (reactive control) is less cognitively demanding. Thus, overreliance or preferencing of one control process can lead to inflexible and inefficient employment of cognitive control, interfering in task outcomes.
Moreover, expectancy (arising from a combination of vulnerability and setting factors) is also thought to shift the control mechanism employed, with higher expectancy of potential interferences in tasks influencing the recruitment of proactive control (Braver,
2012; Burgess & Braver,
2010), particularly when sufficient benefit is thought to occur (i.e., rewards, avoidance of punishment) in return for the higher cognitive load required for proactive control (Grimshaw et al.,
2018). As such, if a child
expects to become distracted by students within the classroom setting and is highly motivated to maintain their attention on a task goal, they may be more inclined to employ proactive control at the expense of it requiring higher cognitive load. On the other hand, if a child is not expecting to become distracted by classmates and/or is not motivated to maintain attention on task goals, they may be more likely to rely on reactive control. Thus, flexibly shifting between the complementary modes of proactive and reactive control as required would be considered most optimal.
Individual differences are also thought to impact engagement of cognitive control processes, influencing preferred recruitment of proactive or reactive control during active task processing. Such individual differences include affect, threat sensitivity (Savine et al.,
2010) and reward sensitivity (Jimura et al.,
2010). For instance, in situations in which positive valence systems are activated and children are sufficiently motivated, it is likely that youth will preference proactive control. Indeed, overactivation of the positive valence system may also lead to an overreliance on proactive control and lead to inflexible recruitment (and thus challenges flexibly shifting to corrections via reactive control as needed). On the other hand, in cases of reduced motivation and/or high task demands, youth may preference reactive control, at the expense of task performance. Indeed, changes in setting factors (e.g., increasing task demands, changing contingencies) may also lead to activation of positive and negative valence systems, and thus impact flexible engagement in proactive and reactive control, as outlined below. Thus, as illustrated in Fig.
1D, differential employment of cognitive control processes of proactive and reactive control may explain current findings in threat and reward biases in irritable youth. In turn, these differences in processing appear to drive variations in the expression and progression of irritability in children (as seen in Fig.
1E). Given current research examining irritability has largely been driven by separating biases in threat and reward (Brotman et al.,
2017a,
2017b; Kircanski et al.,
2019), we thus draw upon these key bodies of research in the application of the DMC framework below as a theoretical avenue to assist conceptualisations of irritability in future research.
Aberrant Threat Processing
Current research on irritability has utilised a range of tasks to assess threat biases in youth. Biases in processing threat information has further been examined with regard to neural processing changes in youth with heightened irritability, providing an index of how brain functioning under conditions of threat may impact behaviour and cognitive processes. Although a number of studies have examined threat biases within irritable youth, these studies have varied widely in their approach to assessment. Specifically, studies include both community and clinical samples of irritability, they have recruited on the basis of diagnoses which have irritability as a key symptom (i.e., DMDD, SMD), or as an associated feature (ADHD, anxiety), and have ranged in severity and age (i.e., infancy, middle childhood, adolescence). Although a considerable number of studies have examined threat biases in youth with psychopathology with irritability as a symptom or associated feature (e.g., ADHD, ODD), this review focuses on studies with direct measures of irritability, or disorders with irritability as a key component (i.e., DMDD, SMD). Studies of threat biases among irritable youth compared to non-irritable youth suggest differences in the interpretation of threat, allocation of attention toward threat, interference of threat information, and sustained attention on threat information. Within the context of the RDoC negative valence system, we draw upon the domains of acute threat (i.e., indexed via allocation of attention toward rewards, and interference of threat information) and sustained threat (i.e., indexed via interference of threat information and sustained attention). Although frustrative nonreward (i.e., indexed via punishment salience and interference, withholding of rewards salience and interference) in the context of the RDoC domains (and Fig.
1C) is placed within the negative valence system, this is discussed below as a separate construct due to its overlap with reward processing. Despite current evidence highlighting differences within threat biases for irritable youth, we emphasise a common theme of inflexible or inefficient employment of proactive and reactive control as a key underlying cognitive process reflected in threat biases.
Attention allocation. Across prior research, threat attention biases have been found to be a feature of irritable youth (Deveney et al.,
2020; Hommer et al.,
2014; Salum et al.,
2017). Specifically, alterations in neural activation have been found during emotion labelling tasks of ambiguous faces in 71 youth aged 9- to 21-years-old with DMDD when compared to healthy controls and those with bipolar disorder (BD) (Wiggins et al.,
2016), suggesting overactivation of acute treat in the negative valence system. Within a community sample of irritable youth, Salum et al. (
2017) assessed the visual allocation of attention to threat stimuli in a sample of in a sample of 6- to 12-years-old using the visual dot-probe paradigm. Children who were often irritable had greater attentional biases towards threat relative to neutral faces when compared to non-irritable children. Hommer et al. (
2014) found similar results in a clinical sample of youths aged between 7- to 17-year-olds with SMD with results indicating that the more SMD and depressive symptoms that youth had, the greater their attentional bias toward threat. Notably, these results were also found after controlling for comorbidity and medication use, demonstrating that irritability plays a role in attentional biases, despite its high co-occurrence with other disorders. Together, the faster reaction times to probes when congruent with threat information combined with slower corrections to threat-incongruent information observed in irritable youth relative to healthy youth in these studies (Hommer et al.,
2014; Salum et al.,
2017) suggests an overactivation of the negative valence system (i.e., acute threat; Fig.
1C). This activation is thought to lead to irritable youth preferencing reactive control and redirecting attention following distraction, rather than proactively selecting to allocate attention to goal-relevant information (i.e., proactive control) thus leading to greater susceptibility to distraction by threat information.
Conversely, Deveney et al. (
2020) investigated visual attention allocation using a dot-probe task with emotional faces whilst measuring event-related brain potential indices of attention. Children’s correct responses earned them gold coins which were exchanged for a prize at the end of the task. Here, findings from Deveney et al. (
2020) suggest that when irritable youth can earn rewards based on their correct responses, these biases toward threat faces are not observed (i.e., no differences in reaction time and accuracy). Instead, it is likely that under conditions of reward which increase motivation, irritable youth can preference more cognitively demanding methods of cognitive control (i.e., proactive control) to maintain their attention on task demands and flexibly shift to correct any interferences in attention once they occur (i.e., reactive control), thus in turn improving task performance. However, in doing so, irritable youth demonstrate greater neural responsivity, reflecting higher cognitive load to engage these processes. This pattern highlights the interplay of both positive and negative valence system activation, in that youth demonstrate a preference for proactive control due to increased motivation (i.e., positive valence system activation) which may override or reduce the impacts of the negative valence system activation induced via threat information and allow more flexible recruitment of both proactive and reactive control. Given little research conducted in this area, further studies are required to understand under which conditions positive valence system activation may override or negate the effects of negative valence systems, and vice versa.
Threat interference. Maladaptive employment of cognitive control is further seen in the capacity of irritable youth to ‘filter out’ distracting information. This was demonstrated in Stoddard et al. (
2017), in which youth with anxiety, DMDD, and/or ADHD, and healthy controls were required to label the gender of faces presented at different emotional intensities. Findings suggested that more severe irritability was associated with lower accuracy in labelling the gender of intensely angry faces, indicating that these youth have difficulty inhibiting threat-related information in order to maintain task goals. Further, heightened irritability and/or anxiety was associated with differential neural activation when presented with angry and happy faces compared to fearful faces. Thus, these findings suggest maladaptive employment of cognitive control as seen in Fig.
1D, in that youth with more severe irritability have greater reliance on correcting attention once distracted (reactive control) as opposed to attempting to actively maintain focus on filtering out distracting information (proactive control), also reflecting overactivation of the negative valence system.
Sustained attention on threat. Biases in sustained attention on threat information is also observed, indicating that irritable youth may be at greater risk of recognising and then maintaining their attention on threats within their environment, and thus limiting their capacity for cognitive control when presented with a goal-directed task. Illustratively, Harrewijn et al. (
2021) found that youth with anxiety and irritability in the context of ADHD, DMDD, and/or ODD looked at negative compared to non-negative faces for longer durations in the happy-angry condition compared to the happy-sad condition on an eye-tracking task. Higher negative affect (a latent factor composed of irritability and anxiety) was associated with longer durations of looking at negative compared to non-negative faces. Moreover, Kircanski et al. (
2018) examined attention to threat using fMRI on a dot-probe task in 8- to 18-year-olds with varying levels of irritability in a transdiagnostic sample. Higher parent-reported irritability was associated with greater neural engagement to maintain control during threat-incongruent trials when requiring attending away from threat. Similarly, Kryza-Lacombe et al. (
2020) found greater neural activation and more pronounced fluctuations in neural activation in irritable versus non-irritable youth when required to shift attention away from threat stimuli on a dot-probe task, despite no differences in overall accuracy and speed. Thus, findings of Kircanski et al. (
2018) and Kryza-Lacombe et al. (
2020) suggest that although task performance may be similar (i.e., reaction time), greater neural engagement is needed to employ proactive control in irritable youth when required to allocate attention away from threat information and maintain attention on task goals. Together, these findings suggest that more severe irritability is associated with sustained attention on negative emotional stimuli relative to non-negative faces, suggesting greater difficulties disengaging attention from salient information, and/or greater attentional capture from emotionally salient information. Thus, findings point to irritable youth being more prone to selecting information and sustaining attention on emotional (compared to non-emotional) faces. In turn, this arguably increases their susceptibility to become frustrated by contextual factors (i.e., negative valence system overactivation) and thus reducing their capacity to recruit proactive control when required to engage in a specific task goal.
Summary. Drawing these findings together, it is clear that there are abnormalities in processing threat stimuli in irritable youth. Findings point to patterns of increased attention toward threats, greater difficulty ignoring threat distractors, and problems redirecting attention back to task goals when distracted by threats. Thus, aberrant threat processing with regard to responding to acute threat and sustained threat (i.e., RDoC domains; Insel et al.,
2010) appears to play a key role in irritable youth, but findings point to potential differences in the cognitive processes underlying these biases (i.e., Fig.
1D). Specifically, youth with high levels of irritability are more prone to emotional interference, both allocating and maintaining attention towards threat information, and as a result leading to overactivation of the negative valence system. Given that individuals with high irritability also require greater neural resources to employ more cognitively demanding modes of cognitive control (i.e., engage in flexible recruitment of proactive control), they may preference less cognitively demanding methods of control (i.e., reactive control), particularly when the outcomes of engaging in this higher cognitive load needed to flexibly shift between both proactive and reactive control is not valuated to be sufficiently rewarding (demonstrating an underactivation of the positive valence system). On the other hand, youth may recruit these more cognitively demanding processes under conditions of possible reward through positive valence system activation.
Aberrant Reward Processing
Similar to research in threat processing, various tasks have been used to provide an indication of aberrant reward biases in irritable children. Many studies have utilised variations of the Posner task to index responses to reward, punishment, and reward omission through behavioural and/or neural responding. Further, studies such as the reversal task and the go/no-go task provide indications of the ability of irritable youth to inhibit responding in the context of reward, reward omission, and punishment. Samples of reward processing in irritability have largely focused on clinical populations of youth in middle childhood, or irritability in very young children (i.e., under 6 years of age). Research into reward processing suggests differences in the salience of reward and punishment, attention toward reward-related cues, reward interference, and response inhibition in irritable youth compared to non-irritable youth. Within the context of the RDoC positive valence system, we draw upon the domains of reward undervaluation (i.e., indexed via reward salience), reward responsiveness (i.e., indexed via attention toward reward/reward omission), reward overvaluation (i.e., indexed via attention toward reward/reward omission, reward interference), and reward learning (i.e., indexed via response inhibition). However, similar to threat processing research, differential activation of these domains influence employment of proactive and reactive control.
Reward salience (undervaluation). Although prior research has focused on threat and reward processing in irritability, few studies have examined attention and task engagement under condition of low or now reward (i.e., positive valence system underactivation). In two studies that have examined attention towards positive stimuli, neither Hommer et al. (
2014) nor Salum et al. (
2017) found biases in attention allocation to happy relative to neutral faces. The absence of attention biases toward happy relative to neutral faces may indicate that happy faces are not considered salient rewards for irritable youth or may be suggestive of reward undervaluation. Dickstein et al. (
2007) also found that SMD and BD youth were less accurate and slower relative to a control group on change trials during a Change Task. Similarly, Cardinale et al. (
2023) found that during a Flanker Task administered at 15 years old with youth with developmental trajectories of irritability and anxiety, irritability was associated with greater neural responding to conflict (i.e., responses on incongruent versus congruent trials) and longer reaction time differences between congruent and incongruent responses, whereas anxiety was associated with decreased neural responding. Thus, findings suggest that youth with more severe irritability may preference reactive control (therefore reducing their speed and accuracy) when required to engage in tasks that are more cognitively demanding, particularly without the potential to earn a reward (i.e., positive valence system underactivation; Fig.
1C). However, the extent to which task performance may be intrinsically rewarding for youth requires much further research. For instance, Fishburn et al. (
2019) examined a group of preschool-aged children in a non-clinical sample on go/no-go task, finding that the temperamental domain of anger/frustration was associated with activation related to slowing down on ‘no go’ trials compared to speed on ‘go’ trials. Specifically, as irritability increased in these youth, activation in the PFC also increased during inhibitory control and thus although community populations of youth with a disposition to experience irritability may require greater cognitive resources to employ cognitive control for the purposes of maintaining attention on a task goal under, these youth are able to recruit proactive control to maintain attention on task goals (albeit reducing their speed). However, it was noted that in this study, youth were engaged via delivery of a story as part of the task goals, which may arguably capture their attention and engagement, and thus be intrinsically rewarding for children. Indeed, one study found that in a group of 208 treatment-seeking 6- to 12-year-olds with DMDD, ADHD, ODD, or DMDD and ADHD, executive functioning (i.e., cognitive flexibility, emotion control) was found to differ in testing situations compared to parent reporting for children with DMDD. Such differences were posited to arise in emotion-neutral situations in which children with DMDD have the capacity to problem solve and reason more flexibly. However, in emotionally demanding situations, children with DMDD may not have the regulatory capacity to cope (Brænden et al.,
2023). Thus, although further research is required to characterise the unique relationships between irritability and neuropsychological functioning, these findings highlight potential differences in setting factors (i.e., task demands) and evaluation of tasks as intrinsically rewarding, and thus influencing preferential employment of cognitive control processes, such as increased ability of irritable youth to flexibly recruit proactive control where tasks may be less cognitively demanding. Thus, these findings suggest differences in the valuation of rewards for irritable youth, highlighting that some tasks may be more intrinsically rewarding for children and motivating youth to employ more proactive methods of cognitive control. However, for some youth prone to irritability, they rely on reactive control, suggesting an undervaluation of either intrinsic or extrinsic rewards and thus underactivation of their positive valence system.
Reward salience (overvaluation). Although the salience of rewards may improve the motivation of highly irritable youth to engage more efficient cognitive control processing, this can become inflexible or limited in the presence of reward overvaluation and/or punishment or frustration for these youth. Kessel et al., (
2016a,
2016b) found that of 425 participants, children with severe DMDD symptoms at age three were associated with increased sensitivity to rewards, indexed by their greater EEG positivity response during a reward task at age nine. Despite no differences in overall performance for those with more severe DMDD symptoms when compared to those with less severe symptoms, and no differences in neural responding in response to punishment, greater neural responsiveness to reward suggests that individuals with severe DMDD respond more positively to the presence of rewards. Moreover, Perlman et al. (
2015) supported these findings in a sample of children with severe irritability when compared to 28 healthy children on a frustration task. Findings indicated that the group with more severe irritability displayed differential neural activation during both losing trials (i.e., blocked goals) and reward trials compared to healthy children, although no differences in reaction times were found. Taken together, these studies suggest that children with more severe irritability are more sensitive to rewards, as indexed by greater EEG positivity, suggesting positive valence system overactivation (i.e., reward overvaluation, reward responsiveness), and experience greater frustration when rewards are omitted or removed (i.e., frustrative nonreward). In turn, this elevated responsivity to rewards may influence irritable youth to engage in proactive methods of cognitive control to meet task demands. However, this may hinder performance when presented with frustrating stimuli or settings, such as reward omission, in which frustrative nonreward is activated and thus proactive methods of cognitive control become inflexible or too cognitively demanding to allow flexible shifting between proactive and reactive control (presented in Fig.
1D).
Attention toward reward. Similar to findings within threat processing, youth with heightened irritability sustain their attention on rewards, thus limiting their capacity to employ proactive control. In a younger sample, He et al. (
2013) assessed 311 Chinese school children in three separate samples completing mood induction prior to the affective Posner task. Similar to in the study conducted by Rich et al. (
2007), He et al. (
2013) found that children acutely experiencing anger and children prone to anger allocated their attention toward reward compared to punishment cues more quickly (i.e., overactivation of the positive valence system; reward responsiveness, reward overvaluation). However, when frustrated, irritable youth have difficulty adjusting their performance to changes in task demands and have less capacity to employ proactive control (i.e., reflecting frustrative nonreward). In addition to these findings, children experiencing anger following the emotion-induction task also had difficulty redirecting their attention back to the task after orienting their attention towards reward cues, particularly after negative feedback. Thus, these findings suggest that highly irritable youth differentially allocate their attention in the context of reward and punishment, likely suggesting greater reward responsiveness and overvaluation of rewards, which in turn may lead to inflexible recruitment of proactive control. However, once frustrated, these youth demonstrate impacts on their ability to sustain their attention on task goals (i.e., employ proactive control) compared to non-irritable youth, reflecting frustrative nonreward. This further highlights the link between the setting conditions (Fig.
1B) and employment of cognitive control processes (Fig.
1D), whereby rewards (or the omission of rewards) within a child’s environment due to changes in task demands influences recruitment of proactive and reactive control.
Reward interference. Irritable youth also appear to have deficits in their ability to redirect attention back to task goals due to reward omission or punishment, suggesting difficulties in flexibly employing both proactive and reactive control as required. For example, Deveney et al. (
2013) examined responses of 19 children with SMD and 23 healthy controls aged 8- to 17-years-old on an affective Posner task. Irritable youth reported higher levels of frustration during the frustration task (i.e., frustrative nonreward; Fig.
1C). Initially, no differences in speed or accuracy were observed between groups, however during the frustration task, participants with SMD were slower than healthy controls on incongruent trials, indicating likely overreliance on proactive control (i.e., not correcting interferences in attention by employing reactive control) and greater interference from frustration. Moreover, Kryza-Lacombe et al. (
2021) found higher irritability was associated with altered processing during reward anticipation and reward omission in a sample of 52 9- to 19-year-olds. Results of these studies both point to youth with higher irritability having difficulty disengaging their attention from cues of punishment or blocked rewards (i.e., difficulty employing reactive control), thus interfering with task goals. These results were similar to those by Tseng et al. (
2018) in that although no differences in performance (reaction time and accuracy) were found, higher irritability was associated with increased activation across a number of neural regions following rigged compared to positive or no feedback, particularly for younger youth (8–11.5 years old). These findings suggest that younger youth with increased irritability require greater neural resources to maintain task goals and shift their attention back to task demands once frustrated (i.e., employ reactive control). Together, findings suggest that although irritable youth may engage in proactive methods of control when motivated by potential rewards due to overactivation of their positive valence system (i.e., increased reward responsiveness, reward overvaluation), this requires greater neural resources and/or it may be rigidly employed. Further, once frustrated, these youth also appear to have difficulty flexibly correcting interferences in attention (i.e., employing reactive control), impacting on their task performance.
Response inhibition. With regard to the responses to reward stimuli, studies also suggest that youth with heightened irritability have difficulty inhibiting both cognitive and behavioural responses when attempting to achieve a desired goal. These differences in response inhibition highlight reduced employment of reactive control due to an overreliance on proactive control. First, Adleman et al. (
2011) examined responses on a simple reversal task of 82 youth with SMD, BD and healthy controls. Youth with SMD made more errors across all trials than both BD and healthy control groups. Moreover, youth with SMD had decreased neural responsiveness in the inferior frontal gyrus, indexing the ability to maintain attention and inhibit both cognitive and behavioural responses when attempting to achieve a desired goal (e.g., receive the reward). Therefore, the findings suggest that youth with SMD have difficulties correcting interferences in attention from negative feedback, further demonstrating an over-reliance on proactive control and inefficient employment of reactive control. In a younger sample, response inhibition was assessed in a sample of 46 children aged 4- to 7-years-old. Children completed a go/no-go task with EEG data and youth with greater irritability had reduced accuracy on no-go trials (relative to the go trials) and faster go reaction times (relative to no-go reaction times) during the frustration conditions, compared to the non-frustration conditions. Higher irritability was also associated with larger amplitudes during frustration. Third, response inhibition was also assessed by Seymour et al. (
2020) in a sample of 105 youth aged 8- to 12-years-old with ADHD and typically developing controls, ranging in irritability severity. On a reward-based frustration go/no-go paradigm, frustration levels reduced response inhibition (i.e., participants had higher commission errors, variability in responding, and attentional lapses) across all conditions. However, given that youth with higher irritability reported higher frustration during the task, the findings suggest that these youth may be more susceptible to frustration when a reward is blocked, leading to reduced response inhibition. Together, these findings suggest that when motivated by a reward (i.e., overactivation of positive valence system via reward overvaluation), youth with greater irritability are more inclined to inflexibly recruit proactive methods of cognitive control, hindering their ability to respond appropriately to detect and correct interferences in their attention (i.e., reactive control).
Summary. Taken together, this nascent but growing body of research suggests that irritable youth not only exhibit threat biases, but they also demonstrate differences in the processing of rewards as well. Highly irritable youth demonstrate greater sensitivity to the possibility of rewards, are more frustrated when experiencing punishment or blocked rewards, and differ in their expectations of rewards and punishment, as suggested in prior research (Brotman et al.,
2017a,
2017b; Kircanski et al.,
2019), reflecting positive valence system overactivation (i.e., reward overvaluation, reward responsiveness), differences in reward learning, and frustrative nonreward (Fig.
1C). Such sensitivity to rewards likely influences irritable youth to engage in proactive methods of cognitive control and improve performance. However, in instances where youth become highly frustrated, such as in response to increased demands of setting factors (e.g., increasing task demands; Adleman et al.,
2011; Deveney et al.,
2013; Rich et al.,
2007) or a negative mood inducing event prior to the task (i.e., He et al.,
2013), reduced capacity to employ proactive control (and thus reduced performance) is observed due to overactivation of the negative valence system. Alternatively, proactive employment of control can become rigid, with youth unable to flexibly employ both proactive and reactive control as required, leading to reduced redirection back to task goals (i.e., reactive control, in Fig.
1D). On the other hand, youth who experience high irritability also demonstrate undervaluation of rewards (Dickstein et al.,
2007), leading to underactivation of the positive valence system. Such underactivation appears to be linked to youth then preferencing less cognitively demanding control systems (reactive control). Together, these findings indicate that although potential rewards can enhance motivation to recruit more cognitively demanding control processes (i.e., proactive control) and flexibly shift between proactive and reactive control, once reward contingencies change, or when the demands of setting factors increase, these approaches can become inflexible or less effective in response to the specific task requirements.